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Abstract Strategy Logic (SL, for short) has been recently introduced by Mo-
gavero, Murano, and Vardi as a useful formalism for reasoning explicitly about
strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns
to be very powerful, subsuming all major previously studied modal logics for
strategic reasoning, including ATL, ATL∗, and the like. Unfortunately, due to its
expressiveness, SL has a non-elementarily decidable model-checking problem
and a highly undecidable satisfiability problem, specifically, Σ11 -HARD. In order
to obtain a decidable sublogic, we introduce and study here One-Goal Strategy
Logic (SL[1G], for short). This logic is a syntactic fragment of SL, strictly sub-
suming ATL∗, which encompasses formulas in prenex normal form having a sin-
gle temporal goal at a time, for every strategy quantification of agents. SL[1G]
is known to have an elementarily decidable model-checking problem. Here we
prove that, unlike SL, it has the bounded tree-model property and its satisfiability
problem is decidable in 2EXPTIME, thus not harder than the one for ATL∗.
1 Introduction
In open-system verification [5, 17], an important area of research is the study of modal
logics for strategic reasoning in the setting of multi-agent games [2, 14, 24]. An impor-
tant contribution in this field has been the development of Alternating-Time Temporal
Logic (ATL∗, for short), introduced by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman [2]. ATL∗ al-
lows reasoning about strategic behavior of agents with temporal goals. Formally, it is
obtained as a generalization of the branching-time temporal logic CTL∗ [7], where the
path quantifiers there exists “E” and for all “A” are replaced with strategic modalities of
the form “〈〈A〉〉” and “[[A]]”, for a set A of agents. Such strategic modalities are used to
express cooperation and competition among agents in order to achieve certain temporal
goals. In particular, these modalities express selective quantifications over those paths
that are the results of infinite games between a coalition and its complement. ATL∗
formulas are interpreted over concurrent game structures (CGS, for short) [2], which
model interacting processes. Given a CGS G and a set A of agents, the ATL∗ formula
〈〈A〉〉ψ holds at a state s of G if there is a set of strategies for the agents in A such
that, no matter which strategy is executed by the agents not in A, the resulting outcome
of the interaction in G satisfies ψ at s. Several decision problems have been investi-
gated about ATL∗; both its model-checking and satisfiability problems are decidable in
2EXPTIME [27]. The complexity of the latter is just like the one for CTL∗ [8, 9].
Despite its powerful expressiveness, ATL∗ suffers from the strong limitation that
strategies are treated only implicitly through modalities that refer to games between
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competing coalitions. To overcome this problem, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman
introduced Strategy Logic (CHP-SL, for short) [3], a logic that treats strategies in
two-player turn-based games as first-order objects. The explicit treatment of strate-
gies in this logic allows the expression of many properties not expressible in ATL∗.
Although the model-checking problem of CHP-SL is known to be decidable, with
a non-elementary upper bound, it is not known if the satisfiability problem is decid-
able [4]. While the basic idea exploited in [4] of explicitly quantify over strategies is
powerful and useful [11], CHP-SL still suffers from various limitations. In particular,
it is limited to two-player turn-based games. Furthermore, CHP-SL does not allow dif-
ferent players to share the same strategy, suggesting that strategies have yet to become
truly first-class objects in this logic. For example, it is impossible to describe the clas-
sic strategy-stealing argument of combinatorial games such as Chess, Go, Hex, and the
like [1].
These considerations led us to introduce and investigate a new Strategy Logic, de-
noted SL, as a more general framework than CHP-SL, for explicit reasoning about
strategies in multi-agent concurrent games [20]. Syntactically, SL extends the linear-
time temporal-logic LTL [26] by means of strategy quantifiers, the existential 〈〈x〉〉 and
the universal [[x]], as well as agent binding (a, x), where a is an agent and x a vari-
able. Intuitively, these elements can be read as “there exists a strategy x”, “for all
strategies x”, and “bind agent a to the strategy associated with x”, respectively. For
example, in a CGS G with agents α, β, and γ, consider the property “α and β have a
common strategy to avoid a failure”. This property can be expressed by the SL formula
〈〈x〉〉[[y]](α, x)(β, x)(γ, y)(G ¬fail ). The variable x is used to select a strategy for the
agents α and β, while y is used to select another one for agent γ such that their com-
position, after the binding, results in a play where fail is never met. Further examples,
motivations, and results can be found in a technical report [19].
The price that one has to pay for the expressiveness of SL w.r.t. ATL∗ is the lack of
important model-theoretic properties and an increased complexity of related decision
problems. In particular, in [20], it was shown that SL does not have the bounded-tree
model property and the related satisfiability problem is highly undecidable, precisely, Σ11 -HARD.
The contrast between the undecidability of the satisfiability problem for SL and the
elementary decidability of the same problem for ATL∗, provides motivation for an inves-
tigation of decidable fragments of SL that subsume ATL∗. In particular, we would like
to understand why SL is computationally more difficult than ATL∗.
We introduce here the syntactic fragment One-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[1G], for
short), which encompasses formulas in a special prenex normal form having a single
temporal goal at a time. This means that every temporal formula ψ is prefixed with a
quantification-binding prefix that quantifies over a tuple of strategies and bind strate-
gies to all agents. With SL[1G] one can express, for example, visibility constraints on
strategies among agents, i.e., only some agents from a coalition have knowledge of the
strategies taken by those in the opponent coalition. Also, one can describe the fact that,
in the Hex game, the strategy-stealing argument does not let the player who adopts it to
win. Observe that both the above properties cannot be expressed neither in ATL∗ nor in
CHP-SL.
In a technical report [19], we showed that SL[1G] is strictly more expressive that
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ATL∗, yet its model-checking problem is 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE, just like the one for
ATL∗, while the same problem for SL is non-elementarily decidable. Our main result
here is that the satisfiability problem for SL[1G] is also 2EXPTIME-COMPLETE. Thus,
in spite of its expressiveness, SL[1G] has the same computational properties of ATL∗,
which suggests that the one-goal restriction is the key to the elementary complexity of
the latter logic too.
To achieve our main result, we use a fundamental property of the semantics of
SL[1G] called elementariness, which allows us to simplify reasoning about strategies
by reducing it to a set of reasonings about actions. This intrinsic characteristic of SL[1G]
means that, to choose an existential strategy, we do not need to know the entire structure
of universally-quantified strategies, as it is the case for SL, but only their values on the
histories of interest. Technically, to formally describe this property, we make use of the
machinery of dependence maps, which is introduced to define a Skolemization proce-
dure for SL, inspired by the one in first-order logic. Using elementariness, we show that
SL[1G] satisfies the bounded tree-model property. This allows us to efficiently make use
of a tree automata-theoretic approach [28, 30] to solve the satisfiability problem. Given
a formula ϕ, we build an alternating co-Büchi tree automaton [16, 23], whose size is
only exponential in the size of ϕ, accepting all bounded-branching tree models of the
formula. Then, together with the complexity of automata-nonemptiness checking, we
get that the satisfiability procedure for SL[1G] is 2EXPTIME. We believe that our proof
techniques are of independent interest and applicable to other logics as well.
Related works. Several works have focused on extensions of ATL∗ to incorporate
more powerful strategic constructs. Among them, we recall the Alternating-TimeµCALCULUS
(AµCALCULUS, for short) [2], Game Logic (GL, for short) [2], Quantified Decision
Modality µCALCULUS (QDµ, for short) [25], Coordination Logic (CL, for short) [10],
and some other extensions considered in [6], [21], and [31]. AµCALCULUS and QDµ
are intrinsically different from SL[1G] (as well as from CHP-SL and ATL∗) as they are
obtained by extending the propositional µ-calculus [15] with strategic modalities. CL is
similar to QDµ, but with LTL temporal operators instead of explicit fixpoint construc-
tors. GL and CHP-SL are orthogonal to SL[1G]. Indeed, they both use more than a
temporal goal, GL has quantifier alternation fixed to one, and CHP-SL only works for
two agents.
The paper is almost self contained; all proofs are reported in the appendixes. In Ap-
pendix 8, we recall standard mathematical notation and some basic definitions that are
used in the paper. Additional details on SL[1G] can be found in the technical report [19].
2 Preliminaries
A concurrent game structure (CGS, for short) [2] is a tuple G , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ,
s0〉, where AP and Ag are finite non-empty sets of atomic propositions and agents, Ac
and St are enumerable non-empty sets of actions and states, s0 ∈ St is a designated
initial state, and λ : St → 2AP is a labeling function that maps each state to the set
of atomic propositions true in that state. Let Dc , AcAg be the set of decisions, i.e.,
functions from Ag to Ac representing the choices of an action for each agent. Then,
τ : St × Dc → St is a transition function mapping a pair of a state and a decision to
a state. If the set of actions is finite, i.e., b = |Ac| < ω, we say that G is b-bounded, or
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simply bounded. If both the sets of actions and states are finite, we say that G is finite.
A track (resp., path) in a CGS G is a finite (resp., an infinite) sequence of states
ρ ∈ St∗ (resp., π ∈ Stω) such that, for all i ∈ [0, |ρ| − 1[ (resp., i ∈ N), there exists a
decision d ∈ Dc such that (ρ)i+1 = τ((ρ)i, d) (resp., (π)i+1 = τ((π)i, d)). A track ρ
is non-trivial if |ρ| > 0, i.e., ρ 6= ε. Trk ⊆ St+ (resp., Pth ⊆ Stω) denotes the set of
all non-trivial tracks (resp., paths). Moreover, Trk(s) , {ρ ∈ Trk : fst(ρ) = s} (resp.,
Pth(s) , {π ∈ Pth : fst(π) = s}) indicates the subsets of tracks (resp., paths) starting
at a state s ∈ St.
A strategy is a partial function f : Trk ⇀ Ac that maps each non-trivial track in its
domain to an action. For a state s ∈ St, a strategy f is said s-total if it is defined on all
tracks starting in s, i.e., dom(f) = Trk(s). Str , Trk⇀ Ac (resp., Str(s) , Trk(s)→
Ac) denotes the set of all (resp., s-total) strategies. For all tracks ρ ∈ Trk, by (f)ρ ∈ Str
we denote the translation of f along ρ, i.e., the strategy with dom((f)ρ) , {lst(ρ) · ρ′ :
ρ · ρ′ ∈ dom(f)} such that (f)ρ(lst(ρ) · ρ′) , f(ρ · ρ′), for all ρ · ρ′ ∈ dom(f).
Let Var be a fixed set of variables. An assignment is a partial function χ : Var ∪
Ag ⇀ Str mapping variables and agents in its domain to a strategy. An assignment χ
is complete if it is defined on all agents, i.e., Ag ⊆ dom(χ). For a state s ∈ St, it is said
that χ is s-total if all strategies χ(l) are s-total, for l ∈ dom(χ). Asg , Var∪Ag ⇀ Str
(resp., Asg(s) , Var∪Ag ⇀ Str(s)) denotes the set of all (resp., s-total) assignments.
Moreover, Asg(X) , X → Str (resp., Asg(X, s) , X → Str(s)) indicates the subset
of X-defined (resp., s-total) assignments, i.e., (resp., s-total) assignments defined on
the set X ⊆ Var ∪ Ag. For all tracks ρ ∈ Trk, by (χ)ρ ∈ Asg(lst(ρ)) we denote the
translation of χ along ρ, i.e., the lst(ρ)-total assignment with dom((χ)ρ) , dom(χ),
such that (χ)ρ(l) , (χ(l))ρ, for all l ∈ dom(χ). For all elements l ∈ Var ∪ Ag, by
χ[l 7→ f] ∈ Asg we denote the new assignment defined on dom(χ[l 7→ f]) , dom(χ)∪
{l} that returns f on l and χ otherwise, i.e., χ[l 7→ f](l), f and χ[l 7→ f](l′),χ(l′), for
all l′∈dom(χ)\{l}.
A path π ∈ Pth(s) starting at a state s ∈ St is a play w.r.t. a complete s-total
assignment χ ∈ Asg(s) ((χ, s)-play, for short) if, for all i ∈ N, it holds that (π)i+1 =
τ((π)i, d), where d(a) , χ(a)((π)≤i), for each a ∈ Ag. The partial function play :
Asg× St⇀ Pth, with dom(play) , {(χ, s) : Ag ⊆ dom(χ) ∧ χ ∈ Asg(s) ∧ s ∈ St},
returns the (χ, s)-play play(χ, s) ∈ Pth(s), for all (χ, s) in its domain.
For a state s ∈ St and a complete s-total assignment χ ∈ Asg(s), the i-th global
translation of (χ, s), with i ∈ N, is the pair of a complete assignment and a state
(χ, s)i , ((χ)(π)≤i , (π)i), where π = play(χ, s).
From now on, we use the name of a CGS as a subscript to extract the components
from its tuple-structure. Accordingly, if G = 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, s0〉, we have AcG =
Ac, λG = λ, s0G = s0, and so on. Also, we use the same notational concept to make
explicit to which CGS the sets Dc, Trk, Pth, etc. are related to. Note that, we omit the
subscripts if the structure can be unambiguously individuated from the context.
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3 One-Goal Strategy Logic
In this section, we introduce syntax and semantics of One-Goal Strategy Logic (SL[1G],
for short), as a syntactic fragment of SL, which we also report here for technical reasons.
For more about SL[1G], see [19].
SL Syntax SL syntactically extends LTL by means of two strategy quantifiers, exis-
tential 〈〈x〉〉 and universal [[x]], and agent binding (a, x), where a is an agent and x is a
variable. Intuitively, these elements can be read, respectively, as “there exists a strategy
x”, “for all strategies x”, and “bind agent a to the strategy associated with the variable
x”. The formal syntax of SL follows.
Definition 1 (SL Syntax). SL formulas are built inductively from the sets of atomic
propositionsAP, variables Var, and agents Ag, by using the following grammar, where
p ∈ AP, x ∈ Var, and a ∈ Ag:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | 〈〈x〉〉ϕ | [[x]]ϕ | (a, x)ϕ.
By sub(ϕ) we denote the set of all subformulas of the SL formula ϕ. For instance,
with ϕ = 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)(F p), we have that sub(ϕ) = {ϕ, (α, x)(F p), (F p), p, t}. By
free(ϕ) we indicate the set of free agents/variables of ϕ defined as the subset of Ag ∪
Var containing (i) all the agents for which there is no variable application before the
occurrence of a temporal operator and (ii) all the variables for which there is an appli-
cation but no quantification. For example, let ϕ = 〈〈x〉〉(α, x)(β, y)(F p) be the formula
on agents Ag = {α, β, γ}. Then, we have free(ϕ) = {γ, y}, since γ is an agent without
any application before F p and y has no quantification at all. A formula ϕ without free
agents (resp., variables), i.e., with free(ϕ) ∩ Ag = ∅ (resp., free(ϕ) ∩ Var = ∅), is
named agent-closed (resp., variable-closed). If ϕ is both agent- and variable-closed, it
is named sentence. By snt(ϕ) we denote the set of all sentences that are subformulas of
ϕ.
SL Semantics As for ATL∗, we define the semantics of SL w.r.t. concurrent game
structures. For a CGS G, a state s, and an s-total assignment χ with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ),
we write G, χ, s |= ϕ to indicate that the formula ϕ holds at s under the assignment χ.
The semantics of SL formulas involving p, ¬, ∧, and ∨ is defined as usual in LTL and
we omit it here (see [19], for the full definition). The semantics of the remaining part,
which involves quantifications, bindings, and temporal operators follows.
Definition 2 (SL Semantics). Given a CGS G, for all SL formulas ϕ, states s ∈ St,
and s-total assignments χ ∈ Asg(s) with free(ϕ) ⊆ dom(χ), the relation G, χ, s |= ϕ
is inductively defined as follows.
1. G, χ, s |= 〈〈x〉〉ϕ iff there exists an s-total strategy f ∈ Str(s) such that G, χ[x 7→
f], s |= ϕ;
2. G, χ, s |= [[x]]ϕ iff for all s-total strategies f ∈ Str(s) it holds that G, χ[x 7→ f], s |=
ϕ.
Moreover, if free(ϕ) ∪ {x} ⊆ dom(χ) ∪ {a} for an agent a ∈ Ag, it holds that:
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3. G, χ, s |= (a, x)ϕ iff G, χ[a 7→ χ(x)], s |= ϕ.
Finally, if χ is also complete, it holds that:
4. G, χ, s |= X ϕ if G, (χ, s)1 |= ϕ;
5. G, χ, s |= ϕ1U ϕ2 if there is an index i ∈ N with k ≤ i such that G, (χ, s)i |= ϕ2
and, for all indexes j∈N with k≤ j<i, it holds that G, (χ, s)j |=ϕ1;
6. G, χ, s |= ϕ1R ϕ2 if, for all indexes i ∈ N with k≤ i, it holds that G, (χ, s)i |=ϕ2
or there is an index j∈N with k≤j<i such that G, (χ, s)j |=ϕ1.
Intuitively, at Items 1 and 2, respectively, we evaluate the existential 〈〈x〉〉 and univer-
sal [[x]] quantifiers over strategies, by associating them to the variable x. Moreover, at
Item 3, by means of an agent binding (a, x), we commit the agent a to a strategy asso-
ciated with the variable x. It is evident that the LTL semantics is simply embedded into
the SL one.
A CGS G is a model of an SL sentence ϕ, denoted by G |= ϕ, iff G, ∅, s0 |= ϕ,
where ∅ is the empty assignment. Moreover, ϕ is satisfiable iff there is a model for it.
Given two CGSs G1, G2 and a sentence ϕ, we say that ϕ is invariant under G1 and G2
iff it holds that: G1 |= ϕ iff G2 |= ϕ. Finally, given two SL formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 with
free(ϕ1) = free(ϕ2), we say that ϕ1 implies ϕ2, in symbols ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2, if, for all CGSs
G, states s ∈ St, and free(ϕ1)-defined s-total assignments χ ∈ Asg(free(ϕ1), s), it
holds that if G, χ, s |= ϕ1 then G, χ, s |= ϕ2. Accordingly, we say that ϕ1 is equivalent
to ϕ2, in symbols ϕ1 ≡ ϕ2, if ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 and ϕ2 ⇒ ϕ1.
s0
∅
s1
p
s2
p,q
s3
q
00 01
10
11
∗∗
∗∗ ∗∗
Figure 1: A CGS G.
As an example, consider the SL sentence
ϕ= 〈〈x〉〉[[y]]〈〈z〉〉((α, x)(β, y)(X p)∧(α, y)(β, z)(X q)).
Note that both agents α and β use the strategy asso-
ciated with y to achieve simultaneously the LTL goals
X p and X q, respectively. A model for ϕ is the CGS
G , 〈{p, q}, {α, β}, {0, 1}, {s0, s1, s2, s3}, λ, τ, s0〉,
where λ(s0) , ∅, λ(s1) , {p}, λ(s2) , {p, q},
λ(s3) , {q}, τ(s0, (0, 0)) , s1, τ(s0, (0, 1)) , s2,
τ(s0, (1, 0)) , s3, and all the remaining transitions go
to s0. See the representation of G depicted in Figure 1,
in which vertexes are states of the game and labels on
edges represent decisions of agents or sets of them, where the symbol ∗ is used in place
of every possible action. Clearly, G |= ϕ by letting, on s0, the variables x to chose action
0 (the formula (α, x)(β, y)(X p) is satisfied for any choice of y, since we can move from
s0 to either s1 or s2, both labeled with p) and z to choose action 1 when y has action 0
and, vice versa, 0 when y has 1 (in both cases, the formula (α, y)(β, z)(X q) is satisfied,
since one can move from s0 to either s2 or s3, both labeled with q).
SL[1G] Syntax To formalize the syntactic fragment SL[1G] of SL, we need first to
define the concepts of quantification and binding prefixes.
Definition 3 (Prefixes). A quantification prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a
finite word ℘ ∈ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]] : x ∈ V}|V| of length |V| such that each variable x ∈ V
occurs just once in ℘. A binding prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables is a finite word
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♭ ∈ {(a, x) : a ∈ Ag ∧ x ∈ V}|Ag| of length |Ag| such that each agent a ∈ Ag occurs
just once in ♭. Finally, Qnt(V) ⊆ {〈〈x〉〉, [[x]] : x ∈ V}|V| and Bnd(V) ⊆ {(a, x) :
a ∈ Ag ∧ x ∈ V}|Ag| denote, respectively, the sets of all quantification and binding
prefixes over variables in V.
We can now define the syntactic fragment we want to analyze. The idea is to force
each group of agent bindings, represented by a binding prefix, to be coupled with a
quantification prefix.
Definition 4 (SL[1G] Syntax). SL[1G] formulas are built inductively from the sets of
atomic propositions AP, quantification prefixes Qnt(V), for V ⊆ Var, and binding
prefixesBnd(Var), by using the following grammar, with p ∈ AP, ℘ ∈ ∪V⊆VarQnt(V),
and ♭ ∈ Bnd(Var):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | ϕ U ϕ | ϕ R ϕ | ℘♭ϕ,
with ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(♭ϕ)), in the formation rule ℘♭ϕ.
In the following, for a goal we mean an SL agent-closed formula of the kind ♭ψ,
where ψ is variable-closed and ♭ ∈ Bnd(free(ψ)). Note that, since ♭ϕ is a goal, it is
agent-closed, so, free(♭ϕ) ⊆ Var. Moreover, an SL[1G] sentence ϕ is principal if it is
of the form ϕ = ℘♭ψ, where ♭ψ is a goal and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(♭ψ)). By psnt(ϕ) ⊆ snt(ϕ)
we denote the set of principal subsentences of the SL[1G] formula ϕ.
As an example, let ϕ1 = ℘♭1ψ1 and ϕ2 = ℘(♭1ψ1 ∧ ♭2ψ2), where ℘ = [[x]]〈〈y〉〉[[z]],
♭1 = (α, x)(β, y)(γ, z), ♭2 = (α, y)(β, z)(γ, y), ψ1 = X p, and ψ2 = X q. Then, it is
evident that ϕ1 ∈ SL[1G] but ϕ2 6∈ SL[1G], since the quantification prefix ℘ of the latter
does not have in its scope a unique goal.
It is fundamental to observe that the formula ϕ1 of the above example cannot be
expressed in ATL∗, as proved in [19] and reported in the following theorem, since its 2-
quantifier alternation cannot be encompassed in the 1-alternation ATL∗ modalities. On
the contrary, each ATL∗ formula of the type 〈〈A〉〉ψ, where A = {α1, . . . , αn} ⊆ Ag =
{α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βm} can be expressed in SL[1G] as follows: 〈〈x1〉〉 · · · 〈〈xn〉〉[[y1]]
· · · [[ym]](α1, x1) · · · (αn, xn)(β1, y1) · · · (βm, ym)ψ.
Theorem 1. SL[1G] is strictly more expressive than ATL∗.
We now give two examples in which we show the importance of the ability to write
specifications with alternation of quantifiers greater than 1 along with strategy sharing.
Example 1 (Escape from Alcatraz1). Consider the situation in which an Alcatraz pris-
oner tries to escape from jail with the help of an external accomplice of him, by he-
licopter. Due to his panoramic point of view, assume that the accomplice has the full
visibility on the behaviors of guards, while the prisoner does not have the same abil-
ity. Therefore, the latter has to put in practice an escape strategy that, independently
from guards moves, can be supported by his accomplice to escape. We can formal-
ize such an intricate situation by means of an SL[1G] sentence as follows. First, let
GA be a CGS modeling the possible situations in which the agents “p” prisoner, “g”
1 We thank Luigi Sauro for having pointed out this example.
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guards, and “a” accomplice can reside, together with all related possible moves. Then,
we can verify the existence of an escape strategy by checking the assertion GA |=
〈〈x〉〉[[y]]〈〈z〉〉(p, x)(g, y)(a, z)(F freeP).
Example 2 (Stealing-Strategy in Hex). Hex is a two-player game, red vs blue, in which
each player in turn places a stone of his color on a single empty hexagonal cell of
the rhomboidal playing board having opposite sides equally colored, either red or blue.
The goal of each player is to be the first to form a path connecting the opposing sides
of the board marked by his color. It is easy to prove that the stealing-strategy argument
does not lead to a winning strategy in Hex, i.e., if the player that moves second copies
the moves of the opponent, he surely loses the play. It is possible to formalize this
fact in SL[1G] as follows. First model Hex with a CGS GH whose states represent a
possible possible configurations reached during a play between “r” red and “b” blue.
Then, express the negation of the stealing-strategy argument by asserting that GH |=
〈〈x〉〉(r, x)(b, x)(F cncr). Intuitively, this sentence says that agent r has a strategy that,
once it is copied (binded) by b it allows the former to win, i.e., to be the first to connect
the related red edges (F cncr).
4 Strategy Quantifications
We now define the concept of dependence map. The key idea is that every quantifica-
tion prefix occurring in an SL formula can be represented by a suitable choice of a
dependence map over strategies. Such a result is at the base of the definition of the ele-
mentariness property and allows us to prove that SL[1G] is elementarily satisfiable, i.e.,
we can simplify a reasoning about strategies by reducing it to a set of local reasonings
about actions [19].
Dependence map First, we introduce some notation regarding quantification prefixes.
Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over a set V(℘) , V ⊆ Var of variables. By
〈〈℘〉〉 , {x ∈ V : ∃i ∈ [0, |℘|[ . (℘)i = 〈〈x〉〉} and [[℘]] , V \ 〈〈℘〉〉 we denote, respec-
tively, the sets of existential and universal variables quantified in ℘. For two variables
x, y ∈ V, we say that x precedes y in ℘, in symbols x<℘y, if x occurs before y in ℘.
Moreover, by Dep(℘) , {(x, y) ∈ V × V : x ∈ [[℘]], y ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 ∧ x<℘y} we denote
the set of dependence pairs, i.e., a dependence relation, on which we derive the param-
eterized version Dep(℘, y) , {x ∈ V : (x, y) ∈ Dep(℘)} containing all variables
from which y depends. Also, we use ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) to indicate the quantification derived
from ℘ by dualizing each quantifier contained in it, i.e., for all i ∈ [0, |℘|[ , it holds
that (℘)i = 〈〈x〉〉 iff (℘)i = [[x]], with x ∈ V. Clearly, 〈〈℘〉〉 = [[℘]] and [[℘]] = 〈〈℘〉〉.
Finally, we define the notion of valuation of variables over a generic set D as a partial
function v : Var ⇀ D mapping every variable in its domain to an element in D. By
ValD(V) , V → D we denote the set of all valuation functions over D defined on
V ⊆ Var.
We now give the semantics for quantification prefixes via the following definition
of dependence map.
A Decidable Fragment of Strategy Logic 9
Definition 5 (Dependence Maps). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification prefix over a
set of variables V ⊆ Var, and D a set. Then, a dependence map for ℘ over D is a
function θ : ValD([[℘]])→ ValD(V) satisfying the following properties:
1. θ(v)↾[[℘]]=v, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]);
2. θ(v1)(x)=θ(v2)(x), for all v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that v1↾Dep(℘,x)=
v2↾Dep(℘,x).
DMD(℘) denotes the set of all dependence maps for ℘ over D.
Intuitively, Item 1 asserts that θ takes the same values of its argument w.r.t. the universal
variables in ℘ and Item 2 ensures that the value of θ w.r.t. an existential variable x in ℘
does not depend on variables not in Dep(℘, x). To get better insight into this definition,
a dependence map θ for ℘ can be considered as a set of Skolem functions that, given
a value for each variable in V that is universally quantified in ℘, returns a possible
value for all the existential variables in ℘, in a way that is consistent w.r.t. the order of
quantifications.
We now state a fundamental theorem that describes how to eliminate strategy quan-
tifications of an SL formula via a choice of a dependence map over strategies. This pro-
cedure, easily proved to be correct by induction on the structure of the formula in [19],
can be seen as the equivalent of the Skolemization in first order logic [13].
Theorem 2 (SL Strategy Quantification). Let G be a CGS and ϕ = ℘ψ an SL sen-
tence, where ψ is agent-closed and ℘ ∈ Qnt(free(ψ)). Then, G |= ϕ iff there exists a de-
pendence map θ ∈ DMStr(s0)(℘) such that G, θ(χ), s0 |= ψ, for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s0).
The above theorem substantially characterizes the SL semantics by means of the
concept of dependence map. In particular, it shows that if a formula is satisfiable then it
is always possible to find a suitable dependence map returning the existential strategies
in response to the universal ones. Such a characterization lends itself to define alterna-
tive semantics of SL, based on the choice of a subset of dependence maps that meet a
certain given property. We do this on the aim of identifying semantic fragments of SL
having better model properties and easier decision problems. With more details, given
a CGS G, one of its states s, and a property P, we say that a sentence ℘ψ is P-satisfiable,
in symbols G |=P ℘ψ, if there exists a dependence map θ meeting P such that, for
all assignment χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that G, θ(χ), s |= ψ. Alternative semantics
identified by a property P are even more interesting if there exists a syntactic fragment
corresponding to it, i.e., each satisfiable sentence of such a fragment is P-satisfiable and
vice versa. In the following, we put in practice this idea in order to show that SL[1G]
has the same complexity of ATL∗w.r.t. the satisfiability problem.
Elementary quantifications According to the above description, we now introduce a
suitable property of dependence maps, called elementariness, together with the related
alternative semantics. Then, in Theorem 3, we state that SL[1G] has the elementariness
property, i.e., each SL[1G] sentence is satisfiable iff it is elementary satisfiable.
Intuitively, a dependence map θ ∈ DMT→D(℘) over functions from a set T to a set
D is elementary if it can be split into a set of dependence maps over D, one for each
element of T, represented by a function θ˜ : T → DMD(℘). This idea allows us to
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enormously simplify the reasoning about strategy quantifications, since we can reduce
them to a set of quantifications over actions, one for each track in their domains.
Note that sets D and T, as well as U and V used in the following, are generic and
in our framework they may refer to actions and strategies (D), tracks (T), and variables
(U and V). In particular, observe that functions from T to D represent strategies. We
prefer to use abstract name, as the properties we describe hold generally.
To formally develop the above idea, we have first to introduce the generic concept
of adjoint function. From now on, we denote by ĝ : Y → (X → Z) the operation
of flipping of a generic function g : X → (Y → Z), i.e., the transformation of g
by swapping the order of its arguments. Such a flipping is well-grounded due to the
following chain of isomorphisms: X→ (Y→ Z) ∼= (X×Y)→ Z ∼= (Y×X)→ Z ∼=
Y→ (X→ Z).
Definition 6 (Adjoint Functions). Let D, T, U, and V be four sets, and m : (T →
D)U → (T→ D)V and m˜ : T→ (DU → DV) two functions. Then, m˜ is the adjoint of
m if m˜(t)(ĝ(t))(x) = m(g)(x)(t), for all g ∈ (T→ D)U, x ∈ V, and t ∈ T.
Intuitively, a function m transforming a map of kind (T → D)U into a new map of
kind (T → D)V has an adjoint m˜ if such a transformation can be done pointwisely
w.r.t. the set T, i.e., we can put out as a common domain the set T and then transform
a map of kind DU in a map of kind DV. Observe that, if a function has an adjoint, this
is unique. Similarly, from an adjoint function it is possible to determine the original
function unambiguously. Thus, it is established a one-to-one correspondence between
functions admitting an adjoint and the adjoint itself.
The formal meaning of the elementariness of a dependence map over generic func-
tions follows.
Definition 7 (Elementary Dependence Maps). Let ℘ ∈ Qnt(V) be a quantification
prefix over a set V ⊆ Var of variables, D and T two sets, and θ ∈ DMT→D(℘) a
dependence map for ℘ over T → D. Then, θ is elementary if it admits an adjoint
function. EDMT→D(℘) denotes the set of all elementary dependence maps for ℘ over
T→ D.
As mentioned above, we now introduce the important variant of SL[1G] semantics
based on the property of elementariness of dependence maps over strategies. We refer
to the related satisfiability concept as elementary satisfiability, in symbols |=E.
The new semantics of SL[1G] formulas involving atomic propositions, Boolean con-
nectives, temporal operators, and agent bindings is defined as for the classic one, where
the modeling relation |= is substituted with |=E , and we omit to report it here. In the
following definition, we only describe the part concerning the quantification prefixes.
Observe that by ζ♭ : Ag→ Var, for ♭ ∈ Bnd(Var), we denote the function associating
to each agent the variable of its binding in ♭.
Definition 8 (SL[1G] Elementary Semantics). Let G be a CGS, s ∈ St one of its states,
and ℘♭ψ an SL[1G] principal sentence. Then G,∅, s |=E ℘♭ψ iff there is an elementary
dependence map θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) for ℘ over Str(s) such that G, θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s |=E ψ,
for all χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s).
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It is immediate to see a strong similarity between the statement of Theorem 2 of SL
strategy quantification and the previous definition. The only crucial difference resides
in the choice of the kind of dependence map. Moreover, observe that, differently from
the classic semantics, the quantifications in a prefix are not treated individually but as
an atomic block. This is due to the necessity of having a strict correlation between the
point-wise structure of the quantified strategies.
Finally, we state the following fundamental theorem which is a key step in the proof
of the bounded model property and decidability of the satisfiability for SL[1G], whose
correctness has been proved in [19]. The idea behind the proof of the elementariness
property resides in the strong similarity between the statement of Theorem 2 of SL
strategy quantification and the definition of the winning condition in a classic turn-based
two-player game. Indeed, on one hand, we say that a sentence is satisfiable iff “there
exists a dependence map such that, for all all assignments, it holds that ...”. On the other
hand, we say that the first player wins a game iff “there exists a strategy for him such
that, for all strategies of the other player, it holds that ...”. The gap between these two
formulations is solved in SL[1G] by using the concept of elementary quantification. So,
we build a two-player turn-based game in which the two players are viewed one as a
dependence map and the other as a valuation over universal quantified variables, both
over actions, such that the formula is satisfied iff the first player wins the game. This
construction is a deep technical evolution of the proof method used for the dualization
of alternating automata on infinite objects [22]. Precisely, it uses Martin’s Determinacy
Theorem [18] on the auxiliary turn-based game to prove that, if there is no dependence
map of a given prefix that satisfies the given property, there is a dependence map of the
dual prefix satisfying its negation.
Theorem 3 (SL[1G] Elementariness). Let G be a CGS andϕ an SL[1G] sentence. Then,
G |=ϕ iff G |=Eϕ.
In order to understand what elementariness means from a syntactic point of view,
note that in SL[1G] it holds that ℘♭X ψ ≡ ℘♭X ℘♭ψ, i.e., we can requantify the strate-
gies to satisfy the inner subformula ψ. This equivalence is a generalization of what is
well know to hold for CTL∗: EX ψ ≡ EX Eψ. Moreover, note that, as reported in [19],
elementariness does not hold for more expressive fragments of SL, such as SL[BG].
5 Bounded Dependence Maps
Here we prove a boundedness property for dependence maps crucial to get, in Section 6,
the bounded tree-model property for SL[1G], which is a preliminary step towards our
decidability proof for the logic.
As already mentioned, on reasoning about the satisfiability of an SL[1G] sentence,
one can simplify the process, via elementariness, by splitting a dependence map over
strategies in a set of dependence maps over actions. Thus, to gain the bounded model
property, it is worth understanding how to build dependence maps over a predetermined
finite set of actions, while preserving the satisfiability of the sentence of interest.
The main difficulty here is that, the verification process of a sentence ϕ over an
(unbounded) CGT T may require some of its subsentences, perhaps in contradiction
among them, to be checked on disjoint subtrees of T . For example, consider the formula
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ϕ = φ1 ∧ φ2, where φ1 = ℘1♭X p and φ2 = ℘2♭X ¬p with ♭ = (α, x)(β, y)(γ, z). It
is evident that, if T |= ϕ, the two strategy quantifications made via the prefixes ℘1 and
℘2 have to select two disjoint subtrees of T on which verify the temporal properties
X p and X ¬p, respectively. So, a correct pruning of T in a bounded tree-model has to
keep the satisfiability of the subsentences φ1 and φ2 separated, by avoiding the collapse
of the relative subtrees, which can be ensured via the use of an appropriate number of
actions.
By means of characterizing properties named overlapping (see Definitions 12 and 13)
on quantification-binding prefixes and sets of dependence maps, called signatures (see
Definition 9) and signature dependences (see Definition 13), respectively, we ensure
that the set of required actions is finite. Practically, we prove that sentences with over-
lapping signatures necessarily share a common subtree, independently from the number
of actions in the model (see Corollary 1). Conversely, sentences with non-overlapping
signatures may need different subtrees. So, a model must have a sufficient big set of
actions, which we prove to be finite anyway (see Theorem 5). Note that, in the previous
example, ϕ to be satisfiable needs to have non-overlapping signatures, since otherwise
there is at least a shared outcome on which verify the incompatible temporal properties
X p and X ¬p.
We now give few more details on the idea behind the properties described above.
Suppose to have a set of quantification prefixes Q ⊆ Qnt(V) over a set of variables
V. We ask whether there is a relation among the elements of Q that forces a set of
related dependence maps to intersect their ranges in at least one valuation of variables.
s0
∅
s1
p
s2
∅
∗0∗ ∗1∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Figure 2: The CGS
GSA.
For instance, consider in the previous example the prefixes to
be set as follows: ℘1 , [[x]]〈〈y〉〉〈〈z〉〉 and ℘2 , [[z]]〈〈y〉〉[[x]].
Then, we want to know whether an arbitrary pair of dependence
maps θ1 ∈ DMD(℘1) and θ2 ∈ DMD(℘2) has intersecting
ranges, for a set D. In this case, since y is existentially quanti-
fied in both prefixes, we can build θ1 and θ2 in such a way they
choose different elements of D on y, when they do the same
choices on the other variables, supposed that |D| > 1. Thus, if
the prefixes share at least an existential variable, it is possible
to find related dependence maps that are non-overlapping. Indeed, in this case, the for-
mula ϕ is satisfied on the CGS GSA of Figure 2, since we can allow y on s0 to chose 0
for ℘1 and 1 for ℘2.
s0
∅
s1
p
s2
∅
0∗0,1∗1 0∗1,1∗0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Figure 3: The CGS GCD .
Now, let consider the following prefixes: ℘1 ,
[[x]]〈〈z〉〉[[y]] and ℘2 , [[z]][[y]]〈〈x〉〉. Although, in this case,
each variable is existentially quantified at most once, we
have that x and z mutually depend in the different prefixes.
So, there is a cyclic dependence that can make two related
non-overlapping dependence maps. Indeed, suppose to have
D = {0, 1}. Then, we can choose θ1 ∈ DMD(℘1) and
θ2 ∈ DMD(℘2) in the way that, for all valuations v1 ∈
dom(θ1) and v2 ∈ dom(θ2), it holds that θ1(v1)(z) , v1(x)
and θ2(v2)(x) , 1 − v2(z). Thus, θ1 and θ2 do not intersect their ranges. In-
A Decidable Fragment of Strategy Logic 13
deed, with the considered prefixes, the formula ϕ is satisfied on the CGS GCD of
Figure 3, by using the dependence maps described above.
Finally, consider a set of prefixes in which there is neither a shared existential
quantified variable nor a cyclic dependence, such as the following: ℘1 , [[x]][[y]]〈〈z〉〉,
℘2, 〈〈y〉〉[[x]][[z]], and ℘3, [[y]]〈〈x〉〉[[z]]. We now show that an arbitrary choice of depen-
dence maps θ1∈DMD(℘1), θ2∈DMD(℘2), and θ3∈DMD(℘3) must have intersecting
ranges, for every set D. Indeed, since y in ℘2 does not depend from any other variable,
there is a value dy∈D such that, for all v2∈dom(θ2), it holds that θ2(v2)(y)=dy . Now,
since x in ℘3 depends only on y, there is a value dx∈D such that, for all v3 ∈dom(θ3)
with v3(y)=dy , it holds that θ3(v3)(x)=dx. Finally, we can determine the value dz∈D
of z in ℘1 since x and y are fixed. So, for all v1∈dom(θ1)with v1(x)=dx and v1(y)=dy ,
it holds that θ1(v1)(z)=dz. Thus, the valuation v∈ValD(V), with v(x)=dx , v(y)=dy ,
and v(z) = dz, is such that v ∈ rng(θ1) ∩ rng(θ2) ∩ rng(θ3). Note that we run this
procedure since we can find at each step an existential variable that depends only on
universal variables previously determined.
In order to formally define the above procedure, we need to introduce some prelim-
inary definitions. As first thing, we generalize the described construction by taking into
account not only quantification prefixes but binding prefixes too. This is due to the fact
that different principal subsentences of the specification can share the same quantifica-
tion prefix by having different binding prefixes. Moreover, we need to introduce a tool
that gives us a way to differentiate the check of the satisfiability of a given sentence in
different parts of the model, since it can use different actions when starts the check from
different states. For this reason, we introduce the concepts of signature and labeled sig-
nature. The first is used to arrange opportunely prefixes with bindings, represented in
a more general form through the use of a generic support set E, while the second al-
lows us to label signatures, by means of a set L, to maintain an information on different
instances of the same sentence.
Definition 9 (Signatures). A signature on a set E is a pair σ , (℘, b) ∈ Qnt(V) ×
VE of a quantification prefix ℘ over V and a surjective function b from E to V, for
a given set of variables V ⊆ Var. A labeled signature on E w.r.t. a set L is a pair
(σ, l) ∈ (Qnt(V) × VE) × L of a signature σ on E and a labeling l in L. The sets
Sig(E) ,
⋃
V⊆VarQnt(V)×V
E and LSig(E,L) , Sig(E) × L contain, respectively,
all signatures on E and labeled signatures on E w.r.t. L.
We now extend the concepts of existential quantification and functional dependence
from prefixes to signatures. By 〈〈σ〉〉 , {e ∈ E : b(e) ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉}, Dep(σ) , {(e′, e′′) ∈
E×E : (b(e′), b(e′′)) ∈ Dep(℘)}, and Col(σ) , {(e′, e′′) ∈ E×E : b(e′) = b(e′′) ∈
[[℘]]}, with σ = (℘, b) ∈ Sig(E), we denote the set of existential elements, and the re-
lation sets of functional dependent and collapsing elements, respectively. Moreover, for
a set S ⊆ Sig(E) of signatures, we define Col(S) , (
⋃
σ∈S Col(σ))
+ as the transitive
relation set of collapsing elements and 〈〈S〉〉 ,
⋃
σ∈S 〈〈S, σ〉〉, with 〈〈S, σ〉〉 , {e ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉
: ∃σ′ ∈ S, e′ = (℘′, b′) ∈ 〈〈σ′〉〉.(σ 6= σ′∨b(e) 6= b′(e′))∧(e, e′) ∈ Col(S)}, as the set
of elements that are existential in two signatures, either directly or via a collapsing chain.
Finally, by Dep′(σ) , {(e′, e′′) ∈ E× E : ∃e′′′ ∈ E . (e′, e′′′) ∈ Col(S) ∧ (e′′′, e′′) ∈
Dep(σ)} we indicate the relation set of functional dependent elements connected via a
collapsing chain.
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As described above, if a set of prefixes has a cyclic dependence between variables,
we are sure to find a set of dependence maps, bijectively related to such prefixes, that do
not share any total assignment in their codomains. Here, we formalize this concept of
dependence by considering bindings too. In particular, the check of dependences is not
done directly on variables, but by means of the associated elements of the support set
E. Note that, in the case of labeled signatures, we do not take into account the labeling
component, since two instances of the same signature with different labeling cannot
have a mutual dependent variable.
To give the formal definition of cyclic dependence, we first provide the definition of
S-chain.
Definition 10 (S-Chain). An S-chain for a set of signatures S ⊆ Sig(E) on E is a pair
(~e, ~σ) ∈ Ek × Sk, with k ∈ [1, ω[ , for which the following hold:
1. lst(~e) ∈ [[lst(~σ)]];
2. ((~e)i, (~e)i+1) ∈ Dep′((~σ)i), for all i ∈ [0, k − 1[ ;
3. (~σ)i 6= (~σ)j , for all i, j ∈ [0, k[ with i < j.
It is important to observe that, due to Item 3, each S-chain cannot have length greater
than |S|.
Now we can give the definition of cyclic dependence.
Definition 11 (Cyclic Dependences). A cyclic dependence for a set of signatures S ⊆
Sig(E) on E is an S-chain (~e, ~σ) such that (lst(~e), fst(~e)) ∈ Dep′(lst(~σ)). Moreover, it
is a cyclic dependence for a set of labeled signatures P ⊆ LSig(E,L) on E w.r.t. L if it
is a cyclic dependence for the set of signatures {σ ∈ Sig(E) : ∃l ∈ L . (σ, l) ∈ P}. The
sets C(S),C(P) ⊆ E+×S+ contain, respectively, all cyclic dependences for signatures
in S and labeled signatures in P.
Observe that |C(S)|≤|E||S| ·|S|!, so, |C(P)|≤|E||P| ·|P|!.
At this point, we can formally define the property of overlapping for signatures. Ac-
cording to the above description, this implies that dependence maps related to prefixes
share at least one total variable valuation in their codomains. Thus, we say that a set
of signatures is overlapping if they do not have common existential variables and there
is no cyclic dependence. Observe that, if there are two different instances of the same
signature having an existential variable, we can still construct a set of dependence maps
that do not share any valuation, so we have to avoid this possibility too.
Definition 12 (Overlapping Signatures). A set S ⊆ Sig(E) of signatures on E is over-
lapping if 〈〈S〉〉 = ∅ and C(S) = ∅. A set P⊆ LSig(E,L) of labeled signatures on E
w.r.t. L is overlapping if the derived set of signatures {σ ∈ Sig(E) : ∃l ∈ L . (σ, l) ∈ P}
is overlapping and, for all (σ, l′), (σ, l′′) ∈ P, if 〈〈σ〉〉 6= ∅ then l′ = l′′.
Finally, to manage the one-to-one connection between signatures and related depen-
dence maps, it is useful to introduce the simple concept of signature dependence, which
associates to every signature a related dependence map. We also define, as expected, the
concept of overlapping for these functions, which intuitively states that the contained
dependence maps have identical valuations of variables in their codomains, once they
are composed with the related functions on the support set.
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Definition 13 (Signature Dependences). A signature dependence for a set of signa-
tures S ⊆ Sig(E) on E over D is a function w : S → ∪(℘,b)∈SDMD(℘) such that,
for all (℘, b) ∈ S, it holds that w((℘, b)) ∈ DMD(℘). A signature dependence for a
set of labeled signatures P ⊆ LSig(E,L) on E w.r.t. L over D is a function w : P →
∪((℘,b),l)∈PDMD(℘) such that, for all ((℘, b), l) ∈ P, it holds that w(((℘, b), l)) ∈
DMD(℘). The sets SigDepD(S) and LSigDepD(P) contain, respectively, all signature
dependences for S and labeled signature dependences for P over D. A signature depen-
dence w ∈ SigDepD(S) is overlapping if ∩(℘,b)∈S{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w(℘, b))} 6= ∅. A
labeled signature dependence w ∈ LSigDepD(P) is overlapping if ∩((℘,b),l)∈P{v ◦ b :
v ∈ rng(w((℘, b), l))} 6= ∅.
As explained above, signatures and signature dependences have a strict correlation
w.r.t. the concept of overlapping. Indeed, the following result holds. The idea here is to
find, at each step of the construction of the common valuation, a variable, called pivot,
that does not depend on other variables whose value is not already set. This is possible if
there are no cyclic dependences and each variable is existential in at most one signature.
Theorem 4 (Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a finite set of over-
lapping signatures on E. Then, for all signature dependences w ∈ SigDepD(S) for S
over a set D, it holds that w is overlapping.
This theorem can be easily lifted to labeled signatures, as stated in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 (Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let P ⊆ LSig(E,L) be a finite set
of overlapping labeled signatures on E w.r.t. L. Then, for all labeled signature depen-
dences w ∈ LSigDepD(P) for P over a set D, it holds that w is overlapping.
Finally, if the set D is sufficiently large, in the case of non-overlapping labeled
signatures, we can find a signature dependence that is non-overlapping too, as reported
in following theorem. The high-level combinatorial idea behind the proof is to assign
to each existential variable, related to a given element of the support set in a signature,
a value containing a univocal flag in P × V(P), where V(P) ,
⋃
((℘,b),l)∈PV(℘),
representing the signature itself. Thus, signatures sharing an existential element surely
have related dependence maps that cannot share a common valuation. Moreover, for
each cyclic dependence, we choose a particular element whose value is the inversion of
that assigned to the element from which it depends, while all other elements preserve
the related values. In this way, in a set of signature having cyclic dependences, there
is one of them whose associated dependence maps have valuations that differ from
those in the dependence maps of the other signatures, since it is the unique that has an
inversion of the values.
Theorem 5 (Non-Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let P ⊆ LSig(E,L) be a set
of labeled signatures on E w.r.t. L. Then, there exists a labeled signature dependence
w ∈ LSigDepD(P) for P over D,P×V(P)×{0, 1}C(P) such that, for all P′ ⊆ P, it
holds that w↾P′ ∈ LSigDepD(P′) is non-overlapping, if P′ is non-overlapping.
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6 Model Properties
We now investigate basic model properties of SL[1G] that turn out to be important on
their own and useful to prove the decidability of the satisfiability problem.
First, recall that the satisfiability problem for branching-time logics can be solved
via tree automata, once a kind of bounded tree-model property holds. Indeed, by using
it, one can build an automaton accepting all models of formulas, or their encoding. So,
we first introduce the concepts of concurrent game tree, decision tree, and decision-
unwinding and then show that SL[1G] is invariant under decision-unwinding, which
directly implies that it satisfies a unbounded tree-model property. Finally, by using the
techniques previously introduced, we further prove that the above property is actually a
bounded tree-model property.
Tree-model property We now introduce two particular kinds of CGS whose structure
is a directed tree. As already explained, we do this since the decidability procedure we
give in the last section of the paper is based on alternating tree automata.
Definition 14 (Concurrent Game Trees). A concurrent game tree (CGT, for short) is
a CGS T , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, ε〉, where (i) St ⊆ ∆∗ is a ∆-tree for a given set ∆ of
directions and (ii) if t·e ∈ St then there is a decision d ∈ Dc such that τ(t, d) = t·e, for
all t ∈ St and e ∈ ∆. Furthermore, T is a decision tree (DT, for short) if (i) St = Dc∗
and (ii) if t · d ∈ St then τ(t, d) = t · d, for all t ∈ St and d ∈ Dc.
Intuitively, CGTs are CGSs with a tree-shaped transition relation and DTs have, in addi-
tion, states uniquely determining the history of computation leading to them.
At this point, we can define a generalization for CGSs of the classic concept of un-
winding of labeled transition systems, namely decision-unwinding. Note that, in general
and differently from ATL∗, SL is not invariant under decision-unwinding, as we show
later. On the contrary, SL[1G] satisfies such an invariance property. This fact allows us
to show that this logic has the unbounded tree-model property.
Definition 15 (Decision-Unwinding). Let G be a CGS. Then, the decision-unwinding
of G is the DT GDU , 〈AP,Ag,AcG ,DcG∗, λ, τ, ε〉 for which there is a surjective func-
tion unw : DcG∗ → StG such that (i) unw(ε) = s0G , (ii) unw(τ(t, d)) = τG(unw(t), d),
and (iii) λ(t) = λG(unw(t)), for all t ∈ DcG∗ and d ∈ DcG .
Note that each CGS G has a unique associated decision-unwinding GDU .
We say that a sentence ϕ has the decision-tree model property if, for each CGS G, it
holds that G |= ϕ iff GDU |= ϕ. By using a standard proof by induction on the structure
of SL[1G] formulas, we can show that this logic is invariant under decision-unwinding,
i.e., each SL[1G] sentence has decision-tree model property, and, consequently, that it
satisfies the unbounded tree-model property. For the case of the combined quantifica-
tion and binding prefixes ℘♭ψ, we can use a technique that allows to build, given an
elementary dependence map θ satisfying the formula on a CGS G, an elementary de-
pendence map θ′ satisfying the same formula over the DT GDU , and vice versa. This
construction is based on a step-by-step transformation of the adjoint of a dependence
maps into another, which is done for each track of the original model. This means that
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we do not actually transform the strategy quantifications but the equivalent infinite set
of action quantifications.
Theorem 6 (SL[1G] Positive Model Properties).
1. SL[1G] is invariant under decision-unwinding;
2. SL[1G] has the decision-tree model property.
Although this result is a generalization of that proved to hold for ATL∗, it actually
represents an important demarcation line between SL[1G] and SL. Indeed, as we show
in the following theorem, SL does not satisfy neither the tree-model property nor, con-
sequently, the invariance under decision-unwinding.
Theorem 7 (SL Negative Model Properties).
1. SL does not have the decision-tree model property;
2. SL is not invariant under decision-unwinding.
Bounded tree-model property We now have all tools we need to prove the bounded
tree-model property for SL[1G], which we recall SL does not satisfy [20]. Actually, we
prove here a stronger property, which we name bounded disjoint satisfiability.
To this aim, we first introduce the new concept regarding the satisfiability of dif-
ferent instances of the same subsentence of the original specification, which intuitively
states that these instances can be checked on disjoint subtrees of the tree model. With
more detail, this property asserts that, if two instances use part of the same subtree,
they are forced to use the same dependence map as well. This intrinsic characteris-
tic of SL[1G] is fundamental to build a unique automaton that checks the truth of all
subsentences, by simply merging their respective automata, without using a projection
operation that eliminates their proper alphabets, which otherwise can be in conflict. In
this way, we are able to avoid an exponential blow-up. A clearer discussion on this point
is reported later in the paper.
Definition 16 (SL[1G] Disjoint Satisfiability). Let T be a CGT, ϕ , ℘♭ψ an SL[1G]
principal sentence, and S , {s ∈ St : T , ∅, s |= ϕ}. Then, T satisfies ϕ disjointly over
S if there exist two functions head : S → DMAc(℘) and body : Trk(ε) → DMAc(℘)
such that, for all s ∈ S and χ ∈ Asg([[℘]], s), it holds that T , θ(χ), s |= ♭ψ, where
the elementary dependence maps θ ∈ EDMStr(s)(℘) is defined as follows: (i) θ˜(s) ,
head(s); (ii) θ˜(ρ) , body(ρ′ · ρ), for all ρ ∈ Trk(s) with |ρ| > 1, where ρ′ ∈ Trk(ε)
is the unique track such that ρ′ · ρ ∈ Trk(ε).
In the following theorem, we finally describe the crucial step behind our automata-
theoretic decidability procedure for SL[1G]. At an high-level, the proof proceeds as
follows. We start from the satisfiability of the specification ϕ over a DT T , whose ex-
istence is ensured by Item 2 of Theorem 6 of SL[1G] positive model properties. Then,
we construct an intermediate DT T♯, called flagged model, which is used to check the
satisfiability of all subsentences of ϕ in a disjoint way. Intuitively, the flagged model
adds a controller agent, named sharp that decides on which subtree a given subsentence
has to be verified. Now, by means of Theorem 3 on the SL[1G] elementariness, we con-
struct the adjoint functions of the dependence maps used to verify the satisfiability of
18 F. Mogavero, A. Murano, G. Perelli, and M.Y. Vardi
the sentences on T♯. Then, by applying Corollary 1 and Theorem 5 of overlapping and
non-overlapping dependence maps, respectively, we transform the dependence maps
over actions, contained in the ranges of the adjoint functions, in a bounded version,
which preserves the satisfiability of the sentences on a bounded pruning T♯′ of T♯. Fi-
nally, we remove the additional agent ♯ obtaining the required bounded DT T ′. Observe
that, due to the particular construction of the bounded dependence maps, the disjoint
satisfiability is preserved after the elimination of ♯.
Theorem 8 (SL[1G] Bounded Tree-Model Property). Let ϕ be an SL[1G] satisfiable
sentence and P , {((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) ∈ LSig(Ag, SL × {0, 1}) : ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) ∧ i ∈
{0, 1}} the set of all labeled signatures on Ag w.r.t. SL×{0, 1} for ϕ. Then, there exists
a b-bounded DT T , with b = |P| · |V(P)| · 2|C(P)|, such that T |= ϕ. Moreover, for all
φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), it holds that T satisfies φ disjointly over the set {s ∈ St : T , ∅, s |= φ}.
7 Satisfiability Procedure
We finally solve the satisfiability problem for SL[1G] and show that it is 2EXPTIME-
COMPLETE, as for ATL∗. The algorithmic procedures is based on an automata-theoretic
approach, which reduces the decision problem for the logic to the emptiness problem
of a suitable universal Co-Büchi tree automaton (UCT, for short) [12]. From an high-
level point of view, the automaton construction seems similar to what was proposed in
literature for CTL∗ [16] and ATL∗ [27]. However, our technique is completely new, since
it is based on the novel notions of elementariness and disjoint satisfiability.
Principal sentences To proceed with the satisfiability procedure, we have to intro-
duce a concept of encoding for an assignment and the labeling of a DT.
Definition 17 (Assignment-Labeling Encoding). Let T be a DT, t ∈ StT one of its
states, andχ ∈ AsgT (V, t) an assignment defined on the setV ⊆ Var. A (ValAcT (V)×
2AP)-labeled DcT -tree T ′ , 〈StT , u〉 is an assignment-labeling encoding for χ on T
if u(lst((ρ)≥1))=(χ̂(ρ), λT (lst(ρ))), for all ρ ∈ TrkT (t).
Observe that there is a unique assignment-labeling encoding for each assignment over
a given DT.
Now, we prove the existence of a UCT UAc♭ψ for each SL[1G] goal ♭ψ having no
principal subsentences. UAc♭ψ recognizes all the assignment-labeling encodings T ′ of
an a priori given assignment χ over a generic DT T , once the goal is satisfied on T
under χ. Intuitively, we start with a UCW, recognizing all infinite words on the alphabet
2AP that satisfy the LTL formula ψ, obtained by a simple variation of the Vardi-Wolper
construction [29]. Then, we run it on the encoding tree T ′ by following the directions
imposed by the assignment in its labeling.
Lemma 1 (SL[1G] Goal Automaton). Let ♭ψ an SL[1G] goal without principal subsen-
tences andAc a finite set of actions. Then, there exists an UCT UAc♭ψ , 〈ValAc(free(♭ψ))×
2AP,Dc,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ ,ℵ♭ψ〉 such that, for all DTs T with AcT = Ac, states t ∈ StT ,
and assignments χ ∈ AsgT (free(♭ψ), t), it holds that T , χ, t |= ♭ψ iff T ′ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ),
where T ′ is the assignment-labeling encoding for χ on T .
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We now introduce a new concept of encoding regarding the elementary dependence
maps over strategies.
Definition 18 (Elementary Dependence-Labeling Encoding). Let T be a DT, t ∈
StT one of its states, and θ ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘) an elementary dependence map over
strategies for a quantification prefix℘ ∈ Qnt(V) over the setV ⊆ Var. A (DMAcT (℘)×
2AP)-labeled ∆-tree T ′ , 〈StT , u〉 is an elementary dependence-labeling encoding for
θ on T if u(lst((ρ)≥1))=(θ˜(ρ), λT (lst(ρ))), for all ρ∈TrkT (t).
Observe that also in this case there exists a unique elementary dependence-model en-
coding for each elementary dependence map over strategies.
Finally, in the next lemma, we show how to handle locally the strategy quantifica-
tions on each state of the model, by simply using a quantification over actions modeled
by the choice of an action dependence map. Intuitively, we guess in the labeling what
is the right part of the dependence map over strategies for each node of the tree and
then verify that, for all assignments of universal variables, the corresponding complete
assignment satisfies the inner formula.
Lemma 2 (SL[1G] Sentence Automaton). Let ℘♭ψ be an SL[1G] principal sentence
without principal subsentences and Ac a finite set of actions. Then, there exists an
UCT UAc℘♭ψ , 〈DMAc(℘) × 2AP,Dc,Q℘♭ψ, δ℘♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ ,ℵ℘♭ψ〉 such that, for all DTs
T with AcT = Ac, states t ∈ StT , and elementary dependence maps over strategies
θ ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘), it holds that T , θ(χ), t |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t), iff
T ′ ∈ L(UAc℘♭ψ), where T ′ is the elementary dependence-labeling encoding for θ on T .
Full sentences By summing up all previous results, we are now able to solve the
satisfiability problem for the full SL[1G] fragment.
To construct the automaton for a given SL[1G] sentence ϕ, we first consider all UCT
UAcφ , for an assigned bounded set Ac, previously described for the principal sentences
φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), in which the inner subsentences are considered as atomic propositions.
Then, thanks to the disjoint satisfiability property of Definition 16, we can merge them
into a unique UCT Uϕ that supplies the dependence map labeling of internal components
UAcφ , by using the two functions head and body contained into its labeling. Moreover,
observe that the final automaton runs on a b-bounded decision tree, where b is obtained
from Theorem 8 on the bounded-tree model property.
Theorem 9 (SL[1G] Automaton). Let ϕ be an SL[1G] sentence. Then, there exists an
UCT Uϕ such that ϕ is satisfiable iff L(Uϕ) 6= ∅.
Finally, by a simple calculation of the size of Uϕ and the complexity of the related
emptiness problem, we state in the next theorem the precise computational complexity
of the satisfiability problem for SL[1G].
Theorem 10 (SL[1G] Satisfiability). The satisfiability problem for SL[1G] is 2EXPTIME-
COMPLETE.
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8 Mathematical Notation
In this short reference appendix, we report the classical mathematical notation and some
common definitions that are used along the whole work.
Classic objects We consider N as the set of natural numbers and [m,n] , {k ∈ N :
m ≤ k ≤ n}, [m,n[ , {k ∈ N : m ≤ k < n}, ]m,n] , {k ∈ N : m < k ≤ n},
and ]m,n[ , {k ∈ N : m < k < n} as its interval subsets, with m ∈ N and
n ∈ N̂ , N ∪ {ω}, where ω is the numerable infinity, i.e., the least infinite ordinal.
Given a set X of objects, we denote by |X| ∈ N̂ ∪ {∞} the cardinality of X, i.e., the
number of its elements, where ∞ represents a more than countable cardinality, and by
2X , {Y : Y ⊆ X} the powerset of X, i.e., the set of all its subsets.
Relations By R ⊆ X × Y we denote a relation between the domain dom(R) ,
X and codomain cod(R) , Y, whose range is indicated by rng(R) , {y ∈ Y :
∃x ∈ X. (x, y) ∈ R}. We use R−1 , {(y, x) ∈ Y × X : (x, y) ∈ R} to represent
the inverse of R itself. Moreover, by S ◦ R, with R ⊆ X × Y and S ⊆ Y × Z, we
denote the composition of R with S , i.e., the relation S ◦ R , {(x, z) ∈ X × Z :
∃y ∈ Y. (x, y) ∈ R ∧ (y, z) ∈ S}. We also use Rn , Rn−1 ◦ R, with n ∈ [1, ω[ , to
indicate the n-iteration of R ⊆ X × Y, where Y ⊆ X and R0 , {(y, y) : y ∈ Y} is
the identity on Y. With R+ ,
⋃<ω
n=1R
n and R∗ , R+ ∪ R0 we denote, respectively,
the transitive and reflexive-transitive closure of R. Finally, for an equivalence relation
R ⊆ X×X on X, we represent with (X/R) , {[x]R : x ∈ X}, where [x]R , {x′ ∈ X :
(x, x′) ∈ R}, the quotient set of X w.r.t. R, i.e., the set of all related equivalence classes
[·]R.
Functions We use the symbol YX ⊆ 2X×Y to denote the set of total functions f from
X to Y, i.e., the relations f ⊆ X × Y such that for all x ∈ dom(f) there is exactly one
element y ∈ cod(f) such that (x, y) ∈ f. Often, we write f : X → Y and f : X ⇀ Y
to indicate, respectively, f ∈ YX and f ∈
⋃
X′⊆XY
X′
. Regarding the latter, note that
we consider f as a partial function from X to Y, where dom(f) ⊆ X contains all and
only the elements for which f is defined. Given a set Z, by f↾Z , f ∩ (Z × Y) we
denote the restriction of f to the set X ∩ Z, i.e., the function f↾Z : X ∩ Z ⇀ Y such
that, for all x ∈ dom(f) ∩ Z, it holds that f↾Z(x) = f(x). Moreover, with ∅ we indicate
a generic empty function, i.e., a function with empty domain. Note that X ∩ Z = ∅
implies f↾Z = ∅. Finally, for two partial functions f, g : X ⇀ Y, we use f ⋒ g and
f ⋓ g to represent, respectively, the union and intersection of these functions defined
as follows: dom(f ⋒ g) , dom(f) ∪ dom(g) \ {x ∈ dom(f) ∩ dom(g) : f(x) 6=
g(x)}, dom(f ⋓ g) , {x ∈ dom(f) ∩ dom(g) : f(x) = g(x)}, (f ⋒ g)(x) = f(x) for
x ∈ dom(f ⋒ g) ∩ dom(f), (f ⋒ g)(x) = g(x) for x ∈ dom(f ⋒ g) ∩ dom(g), and
(f ⋓ g)(x) = f(x) for x ∈ dom(f ⋓ g).
Words By Xn, with n ∈ N, we denote the set of all n-tuples of elements from X,
by X∗ ,
⋃<ω
n=0X
n the set of finite words on the alphabet X, by X+ , X∗ \ {ε} the
set of non-empty words, and by Xω the set of infinite words, where, as usual, ε ∈ X∗
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is the empty word. The length of a word w ∈ X∞ , X∗ ∪ Xω is represented with
|w| ∈ N̂. By (w)i we indicate the i-th letter of the finite word w ∈ X∗, with i ∈ [0,
|w|[ . Furthermore, by fst(w) , (w)0 (resp., lst(w) , (w)|w|−1), we denote the first
(resp., last) letter of w. In addition, by (w)≤i (resp., (w)>i), we indicate the prefix up
to (resp., suffix after) the letter of index i of w, i.e., the finite word built by the first i+1
(resp., last |w|−i−1) letters (w)0, . . . , (w)i (resp., (w)i+1, . . . , (w)|w|−1). We also set,
(w)<0 , ε, (w)<i , (w)≤i−1, (w)≥0 , w, and (w)≥i , (w)>i−1, for i ∈ [1, |w|[ .
Mutatis mutandis, the notations of i-th letter, first, prefix, and suffix apply to infinite
words too. Finally, by pfx(w1, w2) ∈ X∞ we denote the maximal common prefix of
two different words w1, w2 ∈ X∞, i.e., the finite word w ∈ X∗ for which there are two
words w′1, w′2 ∈ X∞ such that w1 = w · w′1, w2 = w · w′2, and fst(w′1) 6= fst(w′2). By
convention, we set pfx(w,w) , w.
Trees For a set ∆ of objects, called directions, a ∆-tree is a set T ⊆ ∆∗ closed under
prefix, i.e., if t · d ∈ T, with d ∈ ∆, then also t ∈ T. We say that it is complete if
it holds that t · d′ ∈ T whenever t · d ∈ T, for all d′ < d, where < ⊆ ∆ × ∆ is
an a priori fixed strict total order on the set of directions that is clear from the context.
Moreover, it is full if T = ∆∗. The elements of T are called nodes and the empty word
ε is the root of T. For every t ∈ T and d ∈ ∆, the node t · d ∈ T is a successor of
t in T. The tree is b-bounded if the maximal number b of its successor nodes is finite,
i.e., b = maxt∈T |{t · d ∈ T : d ∈ ∆}| < ω. A branch of the tree is an infinite word
w ∈ ∆ω such that (w)≤i ∈ T, for all i ∈ N. For a finite set Σ of objects, called symbols,
a Σ-labeled ∆-tree is a quadruple 〈Σ,∆,T, v〉, where T is a ∆-tree and v : T → Σ is
a labeling function. When ∆ and Σ are clear from the context, we call 〈T, v〉 simply a
(labeled) tree.
9 Proofs of Section 5
In this appendix, we give the proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 of overlapping de-
pendence maps and Theorem 5 of non-overlapping dependence maps. In particular, to
prove the first two results, we need to introduce the concept of pivot for a given set
of signatures and then show some useful related properties. Moreover, for the latter
result, we define an apposite ad-hoc signature dependence, based on a sharp combinato-
rial construction, in order to maintain separated the dependence maps associated to the
components of a non-overlapping set of signatures.
Pivot To proceed with the definitions, we have first to introduce some additional nota-
tion. Let E be a set and σ ∈ Sig(E) a signature. Then, [[σ]] , E \ 〈〈σ〉〉 indicates the set
of elements in E associated to universal quantified variables. Moreover, for an element
e ∈ E, we denote by Dep(σ, e) , {e′ ∈ E : (e′, e) ∈ Dep(σ)} the set of elements from
which e is functional dependent. Given another element e′ ∈ E, we say that e precedes
e′ in σ, in symbols e<σe′, if b(e)<℘b(e′), where σ = (℘, b). Observe that this kind of
order is, in general, not total, due to the fact that b is not necessarily injective. Conse-
quently, by min<σ F, with F ⊆ E, we denote the set of minimal elements of F w.r.t.<σ .
Finally, for a given set of signatures S ⊆ Sig(E), we indicate by [[S]] ,
⋂
σ∈S [[σ]] the
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set of elements that are universal in all signatures of S, by Col(S, e) , {e′ ∈ E \ [[S]]
: (e′, e) ∈ Col(S)} the set of existential elements that form a collapsing chain with e,
and by Col(S, σ) , {e ∈ E : ∃e′ ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉 . (e′, e) ∈ Col(S)} the set of elements that
form a collapsing chain with at least one existential element in σ.
Intuitively, a pivot is an element on which we can extend a partial assignment that
is shared by a set of dependence maps related to signatures via a signature dependence,
in order to find a total assignment by an iterative procedure. Let F the domain of a
partial function d : E→ D and e an element not yet defined, i.e., e ∈ E \ F. If, on one
hand, e is existential quantified over a signature σ = (℘, b) and all the elements from
which e depends on that signature are in the domain F, then the value of e is uniquely
determined by the related dependence map. So, e is a pivot. If, on the other hand, e is
universal quantified over all signatures σ ∈ S and all elements that form a collapsing
chain with e are in the domain F, then, also in this case we can define the value of e
being sure to leave the possibility to build a total assignment. So, also in this case e is a
pivot. For this reason, pivot plays a fundamental role in the construction of such shared
assignments. The existence of a pivot for a given finite set of signatures S ⊆ Sig(E)
w.r.t. a fixed domain F of a partial assignment is ensured under the hypothesis that there
are no cyclic dependences in S. The existence proof passes through the development of
three lemmas describing a simple seeking procedure.
With the previous description and the examples of Section 5 in mind, we now for-
mally describe the properties that an element of the support set has to satisfy in order to
be a pivot for a set of signatures w.r.t. an a priori given subset of elements.
Definition 19 (Pivots). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a set of signatures on E and F ⊂ E a subset
of elements. Then, an element e ∈ E is a pivot for S w.r.t. F if e 6∈ F and either one of
the following items holds:
1. e ∈ [[S]] and Col(S, e) ⊆ F;
2. there is a signature σ ∈ S such that e ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉 and Dep(σ, e) ⊆ F.
Intuitively, Item 1 asserts that the pivot is universal quantified over all signatures and all
existential elements that form a collapsing chain starting in the pivot itself are already
defined. On the contrary, Item 2 asserts that the pivot is existential quantified and, on
the relative signature, it depends only on already defined elements.
Before continuing, we provide the auxiliary definition of minimal S-chain.
Definition 20 (Minimal S-Chain). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a set of signatures on E and
F ⊂ E a subset of elements. A pair (~e, ~σ) ∈ Ek × Sk, with k ∈ [1, ω[ , is a minimal
S-chain w.r.t. F if it is an S-chain such that (~e)i ∈ min(~σ)i(E \ F), for all i ∈ [0, k[ .
In addition to the definition of pivot, we also give the formal concept of pivot seeker
that is used, in an iterative procedure, to find a pivot if this exists.
Definition 21 (Pivot Seekers). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a set of signatures on E and F ⊂ E
a subset of elements. Then, a pair (e ·~e, σ · ~σ) ∈ Ek × Sk of sequences of elements and
signatures of length k ∈ [1, ω[ is a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F if the following hold:
1. e ∈ minσ(E \ F);
2. fst(~e) ∈ (〈〈σ〉〉 ∪Col(S, σ)) \ F, if k > 1;
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3. (~e, ~σ) is a minimal S-chain, if k > 1.
Intuitively, a pivot seeker is a snapshot of the seeking procedure at a certain step. Item 1
ensures that the element e we are going to consider as a candidate for pivot depends only
on the elements defined in F. Item 2 builds a link between the signature σ of the present
candidate and the head element fst(~e) of the previous step, in order to maintain infor-
mation about the dependences that are not yet satisfied. Finally, Item 3 is used to ensure
that the procedure avoids loops by checking pivots on signature already considered.
As shown through the above mentioned examples, in the case of overlapping signa-
tures, we can always find a pivot w.r.t. a given set of elements already defined, by means
of a pivot seeker.
The following lemma ensures that we can always start the iterative procedure over
pivot seekers to find a pivot.
Lemma 3 (Pivot Seeker Existence). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a set of signatures on E and
F ⊂ E a subset of elements. Then, there exists a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F of length 1.
Proof. Let σ ∈ S be a generic signature and e ∈ E an element such that e ∈ minσ(E \
F). Then, it is immediate to see that the pair (e, σ) ∈ E1×S1 is a pivot seeker for Sw.r.t.
F of length 1, since Item 1 of Definition 21 of pivot seekers is verified by construction
and Items 2 and 3 are vacuously satisfied.
Now, suppose to have a pivot seeker of length not greater than the size of the support
set E and that no pivot is already found. Then, in the case of signatures without cyclic
dependences, we can always continue the iterative procedure, by extending the previous
pivot seeker of just one further element.
Lemma 4 (Pivot Seeker Extension). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a set of signatures on E with
C(S) = ∅ and F ⊂ E a subset of elements. Moreover, let (e · ~e, σ · ~σ) ∈ Ek × Sk be
a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F of length k ∈ [1, ω[ . Then, if e is not a pivot for S w.r.t. F,
there exists a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F of length k + 1.
Proof. By Item 1 of Definition 21 of pivot seekers, we deduce that e /∈ F andDep(σ, e) ⊆
F. Thus, if e is not a pivot for S w.r.t. F, by Definition 19 of pivot, we have that e 6∈ [[S]]
or Col(S, e) 6⊆ F and, in both cases, e ∈ [[σ]]. We now distinguish the two cases.
– e /∈ [[S]].
There exists a signature σ′ ∈ S such that e ∈ 〈〈σ′〉〉. So, consider an element
e′ ∈ minσ′(E \ F). We now show that the pair of sequences (e′ · e · ~e, σ′ · σ · ~σ) ∈
Ek+1×Sk+1 of length k+1 satisfies Items 1 and 2 of Definition 21. The first item
is trivially verified by construction. Moreover, fst(e · ~e) = e ∈ 〈〈σ′〉〉 \ F. Hence,
the second item holds as well.
– e ∈ [[S]].
We necessarily have thatCol(S, e) 6⊆ F. Thus, there is an element e′ ∈ E\([[S]]∪F)
such that (e′, e) ∈ Col(S). Consequently, there exists also a signature σ′ ∈ S such
that e′ ∈ 〈〈σ′〉〉 \F. So, consider an element e′′ ∈ minσ′(E \F). We now show that
the pair of sequences (e′′ · e · ~e, σ′ · σ · ~σ) ∈ Ek+1 × Sk+1 of length k+ 1 satisfies
Items 1 and 2 of Definition 21. The first item is trivially verified by construction.
Moreover, since (e′, e) ∈ Col(S), by the definition of Col(S, σ′), we have that
fst(e · ~e) = e ∈ Col(S, σ′) \ F. Hence, the second item holds as well.
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At this point, it only remains to show that Item 3 of Definition 21 holds, i.e., that
(e · ~e, σ · ~σ) is a minimal S-chain w.r.t. F. For k = 1, we have that Items 2 and 3 of
Definition 10 of S-chain are vacuously verified. Moreover, since e ∈ [[σ]], also Item 1
of the previous definition holds. Finally, the S-chain is minimal w.r.t. F, due to the
fact that e ∈ minσ(E \ F). Now, suppose that k > 1. Since (~e, ~σ) is already an S-
chain, to prove Items 2 and 3 of Definition 10 of S-chain, we have only to show that
(e, fst(~e)) ∈ Dep′(σ) and σ 6= (~σ)i, for all i ∈ [0, k − 1[ , respectively.
By Items 1 and 2 of Definition 21, we have that e ∈ minσ(E \ F) and fst(~e) ∈
(〈〈σ〉〉 ∪ Col(S, σ)) \ F. So, two cases arise.
– fst(~e) ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉 \ F.
Since e ∈ [[σ]]∩minσ(E\F), we can deduce that (e, fst(~e)) ∈ Dep(σ) ⊆ Dep′(σ).
– fst(~e) ∈ Col(S, σ) \ F.
By the definition of Col(S, σ), there exists e′ ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉 \ F such that (e′, fst(~e)) ∈
Col(S). Now, since e ∈ [[σ]] ∩minσ(E \ F), we can deduce that (e, e′) ∈ Dep(σ).
Thus, by definition of Dep′(σ), it holds that (e, fst(~e)) ∈ Dep′(σ).
Finally, suppose by contradiction that there exists i ∈ [0, k− 1[ such that σ = (~σ)i.
Two cases can arise.
– i = k − 2.
Then, by Item 1 of Definition 10, we have that (~e)i = lst(~e) ∈ [[lst(~σ)]] = [[(~σ)i]];
– i < k − 2.
Then, by Item 2 of Definition 10, we have that ((~e)i, (~e)i+1) ∈ Dep′((~σ)i). Conse-
quently, (~e)i ∈ [[(~σ)i]].
By Definition 20 of minimal S-chain, since (~e, ~σ) is minimal w.r.t.F, it holds that (~e)i ∈
min(~σ)i(E\F). So, (~e)i ∈ [[(~σ)i]]∩min(~σ)i(E\F). Moreover, by Item 2 of Definition 21,
we have that (~e)0 ∈ (〈〈σ〉〉 ∪ Col(S, σ)) \ F = (〈〈(~σ)i〉〉 ∪ Col(S, (~σ)i)) \ F. Thus, by
applying a reasoning similar to the one used above to prove that (e, fst(~e)) ∈ Dep′(σ),
we obtain that ((~e)i, (~e)0) ∈ Dep′((~σ)i) Hence, ((~e)≤i, (~σ)≤i) satisfies Definition 11
of cyclic dependences. So, ((~e)≤i, (~σ)≤i) ∈ C(S) 6= ∅, which is a contradiction.
Finally, if we have run the procedure until all elements in E are visited, the first one
of the last pivot seeker is necessarily a pivot.
Lemma 5 (Seeking Termination). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a finite set of signatures on E
with C(S) = ∅ and F ⊂ E a subset of elements. Moreover, let (e · ~e, σ · ~σ) ∈ Ek × Sk
be a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F of length k , |S|+ 1. Then, e is a pivot for S w.r.t. F.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that e is not a pivot for S w.r.t. F. Then, by Lemma 4
of pivot seeker extension, there exists a pivot seeker for S w.r.t. F of length k+1, which
is impossible due to Item 3 of Definition 21 of pivot seekers, since an S-chain of length
k does not exist.
By appropriately combining the above lemmas, we can prove the existence of a
pivot for a given set of signatures having no cyclic dependences.
Lemma 6 (Pivot Existence). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a finite set of signatures on E with
C(S) = ∅ and F ⊂ E a subset of elements. Then, there exists a pivot for S w.r.t. F.
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Proof. By Lemma 3 of pivot seeker existence, there is a pivot seeker of length 1 for S
w.r.t. F, which can be extended, by using Lemma 4 of pivot seeker extension, at most
|S| < ω times, due to Lemma 5 of seeking termination, before the reach of a pivot e for
S w.r.t. F.
Big signature dependences In order to prove Theorem 5, we first introduce big sig-
nature map w.
Definition 22 (Big Signature Dependences). Let P ⊆ LSig(E) be a set of labeled sig-
natures over a set E, and D = P × V(P)× {0, 1}C(P). Then, the big signature depen-
dence w ∈ SigDepD(P) for P over D is defined as follow. For all (σ, l) = ((℘, b), l) ∈
P, and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), we have that:
1. w((σ, l))(v)(x) , v(x), for all x ∈ [[℘]];
2. w((σ, l))(v)(x) , ((σ, l), x, h), for all x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉, where h ∈ {0, 1}C(P) is such that,
for all (~e, ~σ), the following hold:
(a) if σ = fst(~σ) and x = b(fst(~e)) then h((~e, ~σ)) , 1 − h′((~e, ~σ)), where h′ ∈
{0, 1}C(P) is such that v(b(lst(~e))) = ((σ′, l′), x′, h′), for some (σ′, l′) ∈ P
and x′ ∈ V(P);
(b) if there exists i ∈ [1, |~σ|[ such that σ = (~σ)i and x = b((~e)i), then h((~e, ~σ)) ,
h′((~e, ~σ)), where h′ ∈ {0, 1}C(P) is such that v(b((~e)i)) = ((σ′, l′), x′, h′), for
some (σ′, l′) ∈ P and x′ ∈ V(P);
(c) if none of the above cases apply, set h((~e, ~σ)) , 0.
Note that Items 2a and 2b are mutually exclusive since, by definition of cyclic depen-
dence, each signature (~σ)i occurs only once in ~σ.
It is easy to see that the previous definition is well formed, i.e., that w is actually a
labeled signature dependence. Indeed the following lemma holds.
Lemma 7. Let P ⊆ LSig(E) be a set of labeled signatures over a set E and D =
P×V(P)×{0, 1}C(P). Then the big signature dependence w for P over D is a labeled
signature dependence for P over D.
Proof. We have to show that w(((℘, b), l)) is a dependence map for ℘ over D, for all
(σ, l) ∈ P.
1. By Item 1 of Definition 22 it holds that w((σ, l))(v)(x) = v(x), for all x ∈ [[℘]]
and v ∈ ValD([[℘]]), which means w((σ, l))(v)↾[[℘]] = v, that means that Item 1 of
Definition 5 holds.
2. For the Item 2 of Definition 5, let v1, v2 ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉 such that
(v1)↾Dep(℘,x) = (v2)↾Dep(℘,x). We have to prove thatw((σ, l))(v1)(x) = w((σ, l))(v2)(x).
By definition, we have thatw((σ, l))(v1)(x) = ((σ, l), x, h1) andw((σ, l))(v2)(x) =
((σ, l), x, h2). So, we have only to show that h1 = h2. To do this, consider a
cyclic dependence (~e, ~σ) ∈ C(P) for which there exists i ∈ [0, |~σ|[ such that
σ = (~σ)i and x = b((~e)i). Then, we have that v1(y) = v2(y) = ((σ′, l′), y′, h′) for
y = b((~e)(i−1) mod |~σ|). Then, we have the following:
– by Item 2a of Definition 22, if i = 1 then h1((~e, ~σ)) = 1 − h1′((~e, ~σ)) =
h2((~e, ~σ));
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– by Item 2b of Definition 22, if i ∈ ]1, |~σ|[ then h1((~e, ~σ)) = h1′((~e, ~σ)) =
h2((~e, ~σ)).
On the other side, consider a cyclic dependence (~e, ~σ) ∈ C(P) such that σ 6= (~σ)i
or x 6= b((~e)i), for all i ∈ [0, |~σ|[ . In this case, by Item 2c of Definition 22, we
have that h1((~e, ~σ)) = 0 = h2((~e, ~σ)).
Proofs of theorems We are finally able to show the proofs of the above mentioned
results.
Theorem 4 (Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let S ⊆ Sig(E) be a finite set of over-
lapping signatures on E. Then, for all signature dependences w ∈ SigDepD(S) for S
over a set D, it holds that w is overlapping.
Proof. By Definition 13 of signature dependence, to prove the statement, i.e., that
∩(℘,b)∈S{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w(℘, b))} 6= ∅, we show the existence of a function d ∈ DE
such that, for all signatures σ = (℘, b) ∈ S, there is a valuation vσ ∈ rng(w(σ)) for
which d = vσ ◦ b.
We build d iteratively by means of a succession of partial functions dj : E ⇀ D,
with j ∈ [0, |E|], satisfying the following invariants:
1. dj(e′) = dj(e′′), for all (e′, e′′) ∈ Col(S) ∩ (dom(dj)× dom(dj));
2. for all e ∈ dom(dj), there is i ∈ [0, j[ such that e is a pivot for S w.r.t. dom(di);
3. dom(dj) ⊂ dom(dj+1), where j < |E|;
4. dj = dj+1↾dom(dj), where j < |E|.
Before continuing, observe that, since 〈〈S〉〉 = ∅, for each element e ∈ E\ [[S]], there
exists exactly one signature σe = (℘e, be) ∈ S such that e ∈ 〈〈σe〉〉.
As base case, we simply set d0 , ∅. It is immediate to see that the invariants are
vacuously satisfied.
Now, consider the iterative case j ∈ [0, |E|[ . By Lemma 6 of pivot existence, there
is a pivot ej ∈ E for S w.r.t. dom(dj). Remind that ej 6∈ dom(dj). At this point, two
cases can arise.
– ej ∈ [[S]].
If there is an element e ∈ dom(dj) such that (e, ej) ∈ Col(S) then set dj+1 ,
dj [ej 7→ dj(e)]. By Invariant 1 at step j, the choice of such an element is irrelevant.
Otherwise, choose a value c ∈ D, and set dj+1 , dj [ej 7→ c]. In both cases, all
invariants at step j + 1 are trivially satisfied by construction.
– ej 6∈ [[S]].
Consider a valuation vj ∈ ValD([[℘ej )]] such that vj(bej (e)) = dj(e), for all e ∈
dom(dj)∩ [[σej ]]. The existence of such a valuation is ensured by Invariant 1 at step
j, since dj(e′) = dj(e′′), for all e′, e′′ ∈ dom(dj) with bej (e′) = bej (e′′). Now, set
dj+1 , dj [ej 7→ w(σej )(vj)(bej (ej))]. It remains to verify the invariants at step
j + 1. Invariants 2, 3, and 4 are trivially satisfied by construction. For Invariant 1,
instead, suppose that there exists (ej , e) ∈ Col(S) ∩ (dom(dj+1) × dom(dj+1))
with ej 6= e. By Invariant 2 at step j, there is i ∈ [0, j[ such that e is a pivot for S
w.r.t. dom(di), i.e., e = ei. At this point, two subcases can arise, the first of which
results to be impossible.
A Decidable Fragment of Strategy Logic 29
• ei ∈ [[S]].
By Item 1 of Definition 19 of pivot, it holds that Col(S, ei) ⊆ dom(di). More-
over, since ej 6∈ [[S]] and (ej , ei) ∈ Col(S), it holds that ej ∈ Col(S, ei). Thus,
by a repeated application of Invariant 3 from step i to step j, we have that
ej ∈ dom(di) ⊂ dom(dj) 6∋ ej , which is a contradiction.
• ei 6∈ [[S]].
Since ej, ei 6∈ [[S]] and (ej , ei) ∈ Col(S), it is easy to see that σej = σei and
bej (ej) = bei(ei). Otherwise, we have that ej ∈ 〈〈S〉〉 = ∅, which is impossible.
Hence, it follows that dj+1(ej) = w(σej )(vj)(bej (ej)) = w(σei)(vj)(bei (ei)).
Moreover, di+1(ei) = w(σei)(vi)(bei(ei)). Now, it is easy to observe that
Dep(℘j , bej (ej))=Dep(℘i, bei(ei)), from which we derive that vj↾Dep(℘j ,bej (ej))=
vi↾Dep(℘i,bei (ei))
. At this point, by Item 2 of Definition 5 of dependence maps,
it holds thatw(σei )(vj)(bei(ei))=w(σei )(vi)(bei (ei)), so, dj+1(ej)=di+1(ei).
Finally, by a repeated application of Invariant 4 from step i + 1 to step j, we
obtain that di+1(ei) = dj+1(ei). Hence, dj+1(ej) = dj+1(ei).
By a repeated application of Invariant 3 from step 0 to step |E| − 1, we have that
d|E| is a total function. So, we can now prove that d , d|E| satisfies the statement, i.e.,
d ∈ ∩(℘,b)∈S{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w(℘, b))}.
For each signature σ = (℘, b) ∈ S, consider the universal valuation v′σ ∈ ValD([[℘]])
such that v′σ(b(e)) = d(e), for all e ∈ [[σ]]. The existence of such a valuation is ensured
by Invariant 1 at step |E|. Moreover, let vσ , w(σ)(v′σ). It remains to prove that d =
vσ ◦ b, by showing separately that d↾[[σ]] = (vσ ◦ b)↾[[σ]] and d↾〈〈σ〉〉 = (vσ ◦ b)↾〈〈σ〉〉 hold.
On one hand, by Item 1 of Definition 5, for each x ∈ [[℘]], it holds that v′σ(x) =
w(σ)(v′σ)(x). Thus, for each e ∈ [[σ]], we have that v′σ(b(e)) = w(σ)(v′σ)(b(e)), which
implies d(e) = v′σ(b(e)) = w(σ)(v′σ)(b(e)) = vσ(b(e)) = (vσ ◦ b)(e). So, d↾[[σ]] =
(vσ ◦ b)↾[[σ]].
On the other hand, consider an element e ∈ 〈〈σ〉〉. By Invariant 2 at step |E|, there
is i ∈ [0, |E|[ such that e is a pivot for S w.r.t. dom(di). This means that ei = e and
so σei = σ. So, by construction, we have that di+1(e) = w(σ)(vi)(b(e)). Moreover,
w(σ)(v′σ)(b(e)) = vσ(b(e)) = (vσ ◦ b)(e). Thus, to prove the required statement, we
have only to show that d(e) = di+1(e) and w(σ)(vi)(b(e)) = w(σ)(v′σ)(b(e)). By a
repeated application of Invariants 3 and 4 from step i to step |E| − 1, we obtain that
dom(di) ⊂ dom(d), di = d↾dom(di), and di+1(e) = d(e). Thus, by definition of vi
and v′σ , it follows that vi(b(e′)) = di(e′) = d(e′) = v′σ(b(e′)), for all e′ ∈ dom(di).
At this point, by Item 2 of Definition 19, it holds that Dep(σ, e) ⊆ dom(di), which
implies that vi↾Dep(℘,b(e)) = v′σ↾Dep(℘,b(e)). Hence, by Item 2 of Definition 5, we have
that w(σ)(vi)(b(e)) = w(σ)(v′σ)(b(e)). So, d↾〈〈σ〉〉 = (vσ ◦ b)↾〈〈σ〉〉.
Corollary 1 (Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let P ⊆ LSig(E,L) be a finite set
of overlapping labeled signatures on E w.r.t. L. Then, for all labeled signature depen-
dences w ∈ LSigDepD(P) for P over a set D, it holds that w is overlapping.
Proof. Consider the set P′ , {(σ, l) ∈ P : 〈〈σ〉〉 6= ∅} of all labeled signatures in
P having at least one existential element. Since P is overlapping, by Definition 12 of
overlapping signatures, we have that, for all (σ, l1), (σ, l2) ∈ P′, it holds that l1 = l2.
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So, let S , {σ ∈ Sig(E) : ∃l ∈ L . (σ, l) ∈ P′} be the set of first components of labeled
signatures in P′ and h : S → P′ the bijective function such that h(σ) , (σ, l), for all
σ ∈ S, where l ∈ L is the unique label for which (σ, l) ∈ P′ holds. Now, since S is
overlapping, by Theorem 4 of overlapping dependence maps, we have that the signature
dependence w ◦ h ∈ SigDepD(S) is overlapping as well. Thus, it is immediate to see
that w↾P′ is also overlapping, i.e., by Definition 13 of signature dependences, there
exists d ∈ DE such that d ∈ ∩((℘,b),l)∈P′{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w((℘, b), l))} 6= ∅. At this
point, consider the labeled signatures (σ, l) = ((℘, b), l) ∈ P \ P′. Since 〈〈σ〉〉 = ∅, i.e.,
〈〈℘〉〉 = ∅, we derive that w((σ, l)) ∈ DMD(℘) is the identity dependence map, i.e., it is
the identity function on ValD(V(℘)). Thus, rng(w((σ, l))) = ValD(V(℘)). So, we have
that d ∈ ∩((℘,b),l)∈P{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w((℘, b), l))} 6= ∅. Hence, again by Definition 13,
it holds that w is overlapping.
Theorem 5 (Non-Overlapping Dependence Maps). Let P ⊆ LSig(E,L) be a set
of labeled signatures on E w.r.t. L. Then, there exists a labeled signature dependence
w ∈ LSigDepD(P) for P over D, P × {0, 1}C(P) such that, for all P′ ⊆ P, it holds
that w↾P′ ∈ LSigDepD(P′) is non-overlapping, if P′ is non-overlapping.
Proof. Let S′ , {σ ∈ Sig(E) : ∃l ∈ L . (σ, l) ∈ P′} be the set of signatures that occur
in some labeled signature in P′.
If P′ is non-overlapping, we distinguish the following three cases.
1. There exist (σ, l1), (σ, l2) ∈ P′, with σ = (℘, b), such that 〈〈σ〉〉 6= ∅ and l1 6= l2.
Then, for all valuations v ∈ ValD([[℘]]) and variables x ∈ 〈〈℘〉〉, we have that
w((σ, l1))(v)(x) = ((σ, l1), x, h1) 6= ((σ, l2), x, h2) = w((σ, l1))(v)(x). Thus,
w((σ, l1))(v)(x) ◦ b 6= w((σ, l2))(v)(x) ◦ b, for all v ∈ ValD([[℘]]). Hence, w is
non-overlapping.
2. 〈〈S′〉〉 6= ∅.
Then, there exist σ′ = (℘′, b′), σ′′ = (℘′′, b′′) ∈ S′, e′ ∈ 〈〈σ′〉〉, and e′′ ∈ 〈〈σ′′〉〉
such that σ′ 6= σ′′ or b′(e′) 6= b′′(e′′) and, in both cases, (e′, e′′) ∈ Col(S′). By
contradiction, let d ∈ ∩((℘,b),l)∈P′{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w(((℘, b), l)))}. Observe that
d(e′) = d(e′′), for all (e′, e′′) ∈ Col(S′). So, there exist v′ ∈ ValD([[℘′]]) and v′′ ∈
ValD([[℘
′′]]) such that v′(b′(e)) = d(e), for all e ∈ [[σ′]], and v′′(b′′(e)) = d(e),
for all e ∈ [[σ′′]]. Observe that there are l′, l′′ ∈ L such that (σ′, l′), (σ′′, l′′) ∈ P′.
So, by the hypothesis of the existence of d, we have that w((σ′, l′))(v′)(b′(e′)) =
d(e′) = d(e′′) = w((σ′′, l′′))(v′′)(b′′(e′′)). Now, the following cases arise.
– σ′ 6= σ′′.
By Definition 22 of big signature dependence, it holds that w((σ′, l′))(v′)(b′(e′)) =
((σ′, l′), b′(e′), h′) 6= ((σ′′, l′′), b′′(e′′), h′′) = w((σ′′, l′′))(v′′)(b′′(e′′)), which
is a contradiction.
– σ′ = σ′′.
Then, we have that b′(e′) 6= b′′(e′′). By Definition 22, it holds that w((σ′, l′))
(v′)(b′(e′)) = ((σ′, l′), b′(e′), h′) 6= ((σ′′, l′′), b′′(e′′), h′′) = w((σ′′, l′′))(v′′)
(b′′(e′′)), which is a contradiction.
3. C(S′) 6= ∅.
Then, there exists (~e, ~σ) ∈ C(S′). Let n , |~σ| − 1. Assume, by contradiction, that
there exists d ∈ ∩((℘,b),l)∈P′{v ◦ b : v ∈ rng(w(((℘, b), l)))}. Observe again that
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d(e′) = d(e′′), for all (e′, e′′) ∈ Col(S′). Now, for all (~σ)i = (℘i, bi) ∈ S′
there exists li ∈ L such that ((~σ)i, li) ∈ P′. Moreover, let vi ∈ ValD([[℘i]])
such that vi(bi(e)) = d(e), for all e ∈ [[σi]]. Then, there exist n + 1 functions
h0, ..., hn ∈ {0, 1}C(P) such that, for all i ∈ [0, n], we have that d((~e)i) =
w(((~σ)i, li))(vi)(bi((~e)i)) = (((~σ)i, li), bi((~e)i), hi). Observe that, by Item 2b of
Definition 22, for all i ∈ [0, n[ , it holds that hi+1((~e, ~σ)) = hi((~e, ~σ)) and, in par-
ticular, h0((~e, ~σ)) = hn((~e, ~σ)). However, by Item 2a of Definition 22, it holds that
h0((~e, ~σ)) = 1− hn((~e, ~σ)). So, h0((~e, ~σ)) 6= hn((~e, ~σ)), which is a contradiction.
10 Proofs of Section 6
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 7 on the negative properties for SL. Successively,
we introduce the concept of flagged model and flagged formulas. Finally, we prove
Theorem 8.
Theorem 7 (SL Negative Model Properties). For SL, it holds that:
1. it is not invariant under decision-unwinding;
2. it does not have the decision-tree model property.
Proof. [Item (1)]. Assume by contradiction that SL is invariant under decision-unwinding
and consider the two CGSs G1 , 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τG1 , s0〉 and G2 , 〈AP,Ag,Ac,
St, λ, τG2 , s0〉, withAP = {p},Ag = {α, β},Ac = {0, 1},St = {s0, s′1, s′′1 , s′2, s′′2 , s′3, s′′3},
λ(s2
′) = λ(s2
′′) = {p} and λ(s) = ∅, for all s ∈ St\{s2′, s2′′}, and τG1 and τG2 given
as follow. If by ab we indicate the decision in which agent α takes the action a and agent
β the action b, then we set τG1 and τG2 as follow: τG1(s0, 0∗) = τG2(s0, ∗0) = s1′,
τG1(s0, 1∗) = τG2(s0, ∗1) = s1
′′
, τG1(s1
′, 0∗) = τG2(s1
′, 0∗) = s2′, τG1(s1, 1∗) =
τG2(s1, 1∗) = s3
′
, τG1(s1
′′, 0∗) = τG2(s1
′′, 0∗) = s2′′, τG1(s1
′′, 1∗) = τG2(s1
′′, 1∗) =
s3
′′
, and τG1(s, ∗∗) = τG2(s, ∗∗) = s, for all s ∈ {s2′, s2′′, s3′, s3′′}. Observe that
G1DU = G2DU .
Then, it is evident that G1 |= ϕ iff G1DU |= ϕ iff G2DU |= ϕ iff G2 |= ϕ. In particu-
lar, the property does have to hold for the SL sentenceϕ = 〈〈x〉〉〈〈yp〉〉〈〈y¬p〉〉((α, x)(β, yp)
(X X p))∧ ((α, x)(β, y¬p)(X X ¬p)). It is easy to see that G1 6|= ϕ, while G2 |= ϕ. Thus,
SL cannot be invariant under decision-unwinding.
Indeed, each strategy fx of the agent α in G1 forces to reach only one state at a time
among s′2, s′′2 , s′3, and s′′3 . Formally, for each strategy fx ∈ StrG1(s0), there is a state
s ∈ {s′2, s
′′
2 , s
′
3, s
′′
3} such that, for all strategies fy ∈ StrG1(s0), it holds that (π)2 = s,
where π , play(∅[α 7→ fx][β 7→ fy ], s0). Thus, it is impossible to satisfy both the goals
X X p and X X ¬p with the same strategy of α.
On the contrary, since s0 in G2 is owned by the agent β, we may reach both s′1 and
s′′1 with the same strategy fx of α. Thus, if fx(s0 · s′1) 6= fx(s0 · s′′1 ), we reach, at the same
time, either the pair of states s′2 and s′′3 or s′2 and s′3. Formally, there are a strategy fx ∈
StrG2(s0), with fx(s0 · s′1) 6= fx(s0 · s′′1), a pair of states (sp, s¬p) ∈ {(s′2, s′′3), (s′′2 , s′3)},
and two strategies fyp , fy¬p ∈ StrG2(s0) such that (πp)2 = sp and (π¬p)2 = s¬p, where
πp , play(∅[α 7→ fx][β 7→ fyp ], s0) and π¬p , play(∅[α 7→ fx][β 7→ fy¬p ], s0). Hence,
we can satisfy both the goals X X p and X X ¬p with the same strategy of α.
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[Item (2)]. To prove the statement we have to show that there exists a satisfiable sen-
tence that does not have a DT model. Consider the SL sentenceϕ , ϕ1∧ϕ2, whereϕ1 is
the negation of the sentenceϕ used in Item (1) andϕ2 , [[x]][[y]](α, x)(β, y)X ((〈〈x〉〉〈〈y〉〉(α, x)(β, y)X p)∧
(〈〈x〉〉〈〈y〉〉(α, x)(β, y)X ¬p)). Moreover, note that the sentence ϕ2 is equivalent to the
CTL formula AX ((EX p) ∧ (EX ¬p)). Then, consider the CGS G , 〈AP,Ag,Ac,
St, λ, τ, s0〉 with AP = {p}, Ag = {α, β}, Ac = {0, 1}, St = {s0, s1, s2, s3},
λ(s0)λ(s1) = λ(s3) = ∅ and λ(s2) = {p}, and τ(s0, ∗∗) = s1, τ(s1, 0∗) = s1,
τ(s1, 1∗) = s3, and τ(s, ∗∗) = s, for all s ∈ {s2, s3}.
It is easy to see that G satisfies ϕ. At this point, let T be a DT model of ϕ2. Then,
such a tree has necessarily at least two actions and, consequently, two different succes-
sors t1, t2 ∈ Dc
∗ of the root ε, where t1, t2 ∈ Dc and t1(α) = t2(α). Moreover, there
are two decisions d1, d2 ∈ Dc such that p ∈ λ(t1 · d1) and p 6∈ λ(t2 · d2). Now, let
fx, fyp , fy¬p ∈ Str(ε) be three strategies for which the following holds: fx(ε) = t1(α),
fyp(ε) = t1(β), fy¬p (ε) = t2(β), fx(t1) = d1(α), fyp(t1) = d1(β), fx(t2) = d2(α),
and fy¬p(t2) = d2(β). Then, it is immediate to see that T ,∅[x 7→ fx][yp 7→ fyp ][y¬p 7→
fy¬p ], ε |= ((α, x)(β, yp)(X X p))∧((α, x)(β, y¬p)(X X ¬p)). Thus, we obtain that T 6|=
ϕ1. Hence, ϕ does not have a DT model.
Flagged features A flagged model of a given CGS G is obtained adding a so-called ♯-
agent to the set of agents and flagging every state with two flags. Intuitively, the ♯-agent
takes control of the flag to use in order to establish which part of a given formula is
checked in the CGS. We start giving first the definition of plan and then the concepts of
flagged model and flagged formulas.
Definition 23 (Plans). A track (resp., path) plan in a CGS G is a finite (resp., an infinite)
sequence of decisions κ ∈ Dc∗ (resp., κ ∈ Dcω). TPln , Dc∗ (resp., PPln , Dcω)
denotes the set of all track (resp., path) plans. Moreover, with each non-trivial track
ρ ∈ Trk (resp., path π ∈ Pth) it is associated the set TPln(ρ) , {κ ∈ Dc|ρ|−1
: ∀i ∈ [0, |κ|[ . (ρ)i+1 = τ((ρ)i, (κ)i)} ⊆ TPln (resp., PPln(π) , {κ ∈ Dcω
: ∀i ∈ N . (π)i+1 = τ((π)i, (κ)i)} ⊆ PPln) of track (resp., path) plans that are
consistent with ρ (resp., π).
Definition 24 (Flagged model). Let G = 〈AP,Ag,Ac, St, λ, τ, s0〉 be a CGS with
|Ac| ≥ 2. Let ♯ /∈ Ag and c♯ ∈ Ac. Then, the flagged CGS is defined as follows:
G♯ = 〈AP,Ag ∪ {♯},Ac, St× {0, 1}, λ♯, τ♯, (s0, 0)〉
where λ♯(s, ι) , λ(s), for all s ∈ St and ι ∈ {0, 1}, and τ♯((s, ι), d) , (τ(s, d↾Ag), ι′)
with ι′ = 0 iff d(♯) = c♯.
Since G and G♯ have a different set of agents, an agent-closed formula ϕ w.r.t. AgG
is clearly not agent-closed w.r.t. AgG♯ . For this reason, we introduce the concept of
flagged formulas, that represent, in some sense, the agent-closure of formulas.
Definition 25 (Flagged formulas). Let ϕ ∈ SL[1G]. The universal flagged formula of
ϕ, in symbol ϕA♯, is obtained by replacing every principal subsentence φ ∈ psnt(ϕ)
with the formula φA♯ , [[x♯]](♯, x♯)φ. The existential flagged formula of ϕ, in symbol
ϕE♯, is obtained by replacing every principal subsentenceφ ∈ psnt(ϕ) with the formula
φE♯ , 〈〈x♯〉〉(♯, x♯)φ.
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Substantially, these definitions help us to check satisfiability of principal subsen-
tences in a separate way. The special agent ♯ takes control, over the flagged model,
of which branch to walk on the satisfiability of some φ ∈ psnt(ϕ). Obviously, there
is a strict connection between satisfiability of flagged formulas over G♯ and ϕ over G.
Indeed, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 8 (Flagged model satisfiability). Let ϕ ∈ SL[1G] and let ϕA♯ and ϕE♯ the
flagged formulas. Moreover, let G be a CGS and G♯ his relative flagged CGS. Then, for
all s ∈ St, it holds that:
1. if G, ∅, s |= ϕ then G♯, ∅(s, ι) |= ϕA♯, for all ι ∈ {0, 1};
2. if, for all ι ∈ {0, 1} it holds that G♯, ∅, (s, ι) |= ϕE♯, then G, ∅, s |= ϕ.
Proof. On the first case, let θ ∈ DMStrG (℘), we consider θA♯ ∈ DMStrG♯ ([[x♯]]℘)
such that if x 6= x♯ then θA♯(χ)(x) = θ(χ)(x), otherwise θA♯(χ)(x) = χ(x♯). On
the second case, let θE♯ ∈ DMStrG♯ (〈〈x♯〉〉℘), we consider θ ∈ DMStrG (℘) such that
θ(χ)(x)) = θE♯(χ)(x)) (note that dom(θ(χ)) is strictly included in dom(θE♯(χ))).
Now, given a binding ♭ and its relative function ζ♭, consider ♭♯ , (♯, x♯)♭ and its relative
function ζ♭,♯. We show that in both cases considered above there is some useful relation
between π♭ , play(θ(χ) ◦ ζ♭, s) and π♭,♯ , play(θ♯(χ) ◦ ζ♭,♯, (s, ι)). Indeed, let κ♭
the plan such that, for all i ∈ N, we have that (π♭)i+1 = τ((π♭)i, (κ♭)i) and let κ♭,♯
the plan such that, for all i ∈ N, we have that (π♭,♯)i+1 = τ((π♭,♯)i, (κ♭,♯)i). By the
definition of play, for each i ∈ N and a ∈ Ag, we have that (κ♭)i(a) = (θ(χ) ◦
ζ♭)(a)((π♭)i) and (κ♭,♯)i(a) = (θ♯(χ)◦ζ♭,♯)(a)((π♭,♯)i). Clearly, for all i ∈ N, we have
that (κ♭)i = ((κ♭,♯)i)↾Ag. Due to these facts, we can prove by induction that for each
i ∈ N there exists ι ∈ {0, 1} such that (π♭,♯)i = ((π♭)i, ι). The base case is trivial and
we omit it here. As inductive case, suppose that (π♭,♯)i = ((π♭)i, ι), for some i. Then,
by definition we have that (π♭,♯)i+1 = τ♯((π♭,♯)i, (κ♭,♯)i). Moreover, by definition of
τ♯, we have that (π♭,♯)i+1 = (τ((π♭)i, ((κ♭,♯)i)↾Ag), ι′), for some ι′ ∈ {0, 1}. Since
(κ♭)i = ((κ♭,♯)i)↾Ag, we have that (π♭,♯)i+1 = (τ((π♭)i, (κ♭)i), ι′) = ((π♭)i+1, ι′),
which is the assert. It follows, by definition of λ♯, that λ((π♭)i) = λ♯((π♭,♯)i), for each
i ∈ N. So, every sentence satisfied on π♭ is satisfied also on π♭,♯. Now we proceed to
prove Items 1 and 2, separately. Item 1. First, consider the case that φ is of the form
℘ψ, where ℘ is a quantification prefix and ψ is a boolean composition of goals. Since
G, ∅, s |= φ, there exists θ ∈ DMStrG (℘) such that we have G, θ(χ), s |= ψ, for all
assignment χ ∈ AsgG(s). Now, consider φA,♯ , [[x♯]](♯, x♯)φ, which is equivalent to
[[x♯]]℘(♯, x♯)ψ. Then, consider θA♯ ∈ DMStrG♯ ([[x♯]]℘) such that θA♯(χ)(x) = θ(χ)(x),
if x 6= x♯, and θ♯(χ)(x) = χ(x♯), otherwise. Clearly, θA♯ is build starting from θ as
described above. Then, from the fact that G, ∅, s |= φ, it follows that G♯, ∅, (s, ι) |= φA♯.
Now, if we have a formulaϕ embedding some proper principal subsentence, then by the
induction hypothesis every φ ∈ psnt(ϕ) is satisfied by G if and only if φA,♯ is satisfied
by G♯. By working on the structure of the formula it follows that the result holds for ϕ
and ϕA♯ too, so the proof for this Item is done.
Item 2. First, consider the case of φ is of the form℘ψ, where℘ is a quantification pre-
fix and ψ is a boolean composition of goals. Let G♯, ∅, (s, ι) |= φE,♯. Note that φE,♯ ,
〈〈x♯〉〉(♯, x♯)℘ψ is equivalent to 〈〈x♯〉〉℘(♯, x♯)ψ, so there exists θE♯ ∈ DMStrG♯ (〈〈x♯〉〉℘)
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such that, for all assignment χ ∈ AsgG♯(〈〈x♯〉〉℘), we have that G♯, θE♯(χ), (s, ι) |=
(♯, x♯)ψ. Then, consider θ ∈ DMStrG given by θ(χ)(x)) = θ♯(χ)(x)). Clearly, θ is
build starting from θE♯ as described above. Then, from G♯, θE♯(χ), (s, ι) |= (♯, x♯)ψ it
follows that G, ∅, s |= φ. Now, if we have a formula ϕ embedding some proper princi-
pal subsentence, then by the induction hypothesis every φ ∈ psnt(ϕ) is satisfied by G if
and only if φA,♯ is satisfied by G♯. By working on the structure of the formula it follows
that the result holds for ϕ and ϕE♯ too, so the proof for this Item is done.
Proof of Theorem 8 From now on, by using Item 2 of Theorem 6, we can assume to
work exclusively on CGTs. Let Sφ , {s ∈ StT : T , ∅, s |= φ} and Tφ , Sφ × {0, 1}.
By Item 1 of Lemma 8, we have that T♯, ∅, t |= φA♯, for all t ∈ Tφ. Moreover, for all
t ∈ Tφ, consider a strategy f♯t ∈ StrT♯(t) given by f♯
t(ρ) = c♯ iff ρ = t. Moreover,
for all φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), consider the function Aφ : TrkT♯(ε) → 2
(StT♯×TrkT♯ ) given by
Aφ(ρ) , {(ρi, ρ′) : i ∈ [0, |ρ|[ ∧ρ′ ∈ TrkT♯(∅[♯ → f
ρi
♯ ], ρi) ∧ lst(ρ) = lst(ρ
′)}. Note
that (lst(ρ), lst(ρ)) ∈ Aφ(ρ). Indeed: (i) lst(ρ) = ρ|ρ|; (ii) lst(ρ)) ∈ TrkT♯(∅[♯ →
f
lst(ρ)
♯ ], lst(ρ)); and (iii) lst(ρ) = lst(lst(ρ)). Observe that if (ρi, ρ′) ∈ Aφ(ρ) then
ρ′ = ρ≥i. Hence, except for (lst(ρ), lst(ρ)), there exists at most one pair in Aφ(ρ).
Indeed, by contradiction let (ρi, ρ≥i) and (ρj , ρ≥j) both in Aφ(ρ) with i  j and
j 6= |ρ|. Then, by the definition of compatible tracks TrkT♯(∅[♯ → f
ρ
♯ ], ρi), there exists
a plan κ ∈ Pln(ρ≥i) such that for all h ∈ [0, |ρ| − i[ we have κh(♯) = fρ♯ ((ρ≥i)≤h).
Then, by the definition of fρ♯ , κh(♯) 6= c♯. So, by the definition of plan and τ♯, we have
that ρj+1 = (s, 1). On the other hand, since (ρj , ρ≥j) ∈ Aφ(ρ), then there exists a plan
κ′ ∈ Pln(ρ≥j) such that (κ′)0(♯) = f
ρ≥j
♯ (ρ≥j) = c♯. Which implies, by the definition
of plan and τ♯, we have that ρj+1 = (s′, 0), which is in contradiction with the fact that
the second coordinate of ρj+1 is 1, as shown above.
This reasoning allows us to build the functions headφ and bodyφ for the disjoint
satisfiability of φ over T♯ on the set Tφ. Indeed, the unique element (ρi, ρ′) ∈ Aφ(ρ) \
{(lst(ρ), lst(ρ))} can be used to define opportunely the elementary dependence map
used for such disjoint satisfiability.
Theorem 8 (SL[1G] Bounded Tree-Model Property). Let ϕ be an SL[1G] satisfiable
sentence and P , {((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) ∈ LSig(Ag, SL × {0, 1}) : ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) ∧ i ∈
{0, 1}} the set of all labeled signatures on Ag w.r.t. SL×{0, 1} for ϕ. Then, there exists
a b-bounded DT T , with b = |P| · |V(P)| · 2|C(P)|, such that T |= ϕ. Moreover, for all
φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), it holds that T satisfies φ disjointly over the set {s ∈ St : T , ∅, s |= φ}.
Proof. Since ϕ is satisfiable, then, by Item 2 of Theorem 6, we have that there exists
a DT T , such that T |= ϕ. We now prove that there exists a bounded DT T ′ , 〈AP,
Ag,AcT ′ , StT ′ ], λT ′ , τT ′ , ε〉 with AcT ′ , [0, n[ and n = |P| · |V(P)| · 2|C(P)|. Since
T ′ is a DT, we have to define only the labeling function λT ′ . To do this, we need
two auxiliary functions h : StT × DcT ′ → DcT and g : StT ′ → StT that lift cor-
rectly the labeling function λT to λT ′ . Function g is defined recursively as follows:
(i) g(ε) , ε, (ii) g(t′ · d′) , g(t′) · h(g(t′), d′). Then, for all t′ ∈ StT ′ , we define
λT ′(t
′) , λT (g(t
′)). It remains to define the function h. By Item 1 of Lemma 8, we
have that T♯ |= ϕA♯ and consequently that T♯ |= ϕE♯. Moreover, applying the reason-
ing explained above, T♯ satisfies disjointly φ over Sφ, for all φ ∈ psnt(ϕ). Then, for
A Decidable Fragment of Strategy Logic 35
all φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), we have that there exist a function headφ : Sφ → DMAcT (℘) and a
function bodyφ : TrkT (ε) → DMAcT (℘) that allow T to satisfy φ in a disjoint way
over Sφ. Now, by Theorem 5, there exists a signature dependencew ∈ LSigDepAcT ′ (P)
such that, for all P′ ⊆ P, we have that w↾P′ ∈ LSigDepAcT ′ (P) is non-overlapping, if
P is non-overlapping. Moreover, by Corollary 1, for all P′ ⊆ P, we have that w↾P′ ∈
LSigDepAcT ′ (P) is overlapping, ifP is overlapping. At this point, consider the function
D : DcT ′ → 2P that, for all d′ ∈ DcT ′ , is given by D(d′) , {((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) = σ ∈ P
: ∃e′ ∈ AcT ′
[[(]]℘).d′ = w(σ)(e′) ◦ ζ}. Note that, for all d′ ∈ DcT ′ , we have that
D(d) ⊆ P is overlapping. Now, consider the functions W : StT♯ → LSigDepAcT (P)
such that, for all t ∈ StT♯ and σ = ((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) ∈ P, is such that
W(t)(σ) =
{
headφ(t) , t ∈ Tφ
bodyφ(ρ
′) , otherwise
where φ = ℘♭ψ and ρ′ ∈ TrkT♯(ε) is the unique track such that lst(ρ′) = t. Moreover,
consider the function T : StT♯ ×DcT → 2P such that, for all t ∈ StT♯ and d ∈ DcT , it
is given by T(t, d) , {σ = ((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) ∈ P : ∃e ∈ AcT [[℘]].d = W(t)(e) ◦ ζ}. It is
easy to see that, for all d′ ∈ DcT ′ and t ∈ StT♯ , there exists d ∈ DcT such that D(d′) ⊆
T(t, d). By Corollary 1, for all t ∈ StT♯ , we have that W(t)↾D(d′) is overlapping. So,
by Definition 13, for all t ∈ StT♯ and d′ ∈ DcT ′ , there exists d ∈ AcT♯Ag such that
d ∈ ∩σ=(℘,ζ),(ψ,i)∈D(d′){z ◦ b : z ∈ rng(W(t)(σ))}, which implies T(t, d) ⊇ D(d′).
Finally, by applying the previous reasoning we obtain the function h such that, for all
(t, d′) ∈ StT × DcT ′ , it associates a decision h(t, d′) , d ∈ DcT . The proof that
T ′ |= ϕ proceeds naturally by induction and it is omitted here.
11 Proofs of Section 7
In this appendix, we give the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 of SL[1G] goal and sentence
automaton and Theorems 9 and 10 of SL[1G] automaton and satisfiability.
Alternating tree automata Nondeterministic tree automata are a generalization to
infinite trees of the classical nondeterministic word automata on infinite words. Alter-
nating tree automata are a further generalization of nondeterministic tree automata [22].
Intuitively, on visiting a node of the input tree, while the latter sends exactly one copy
of itself to each of the successors of the node, the former can send several own copies to
the same successor. Here we use, in particular, alternating parity tree automata, which
are alternating tree automata along with a parity acceptance condition (see [12], for a
survey).
We now give the formal definition of alternating tree automata.
Definition 26 (Alternating Tree Automata). An alternating tree automaton (ATA, for
short) is a tuple A , 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉, where Σ, ∆, and Q are, respectively, non-
empty finite sets of input symbols, directions, and states, q0 ∈ Q is an initial state,
ℵ is an acceptance condition to be defined later, and δ : Q × Σ → B+(∆ × Q) is
an alternating transition function that maps each pair of states and input symbols to a
positive Boolean combination on the set of propositions of the form (d, q) ∈ ∆ × Q,
a.k.a. moves.
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On one side, a nondeterministic tree automaton (NTA, for short) is a special case of
ATA in which each conjunction in the transition function δ has exactly one move (d, q)
associated with each direction d. This means that, for all states q ∈ Q and symbols σ ∈
Σ, we have that δ(q, σ) is equivalent to a Boolean formula of the form
∨
i
∧
d∈∆(d, qi,d).
On the other side, a universal tree automaton (UTA, for short) is a special case of ATA
in which all the Boolean combinations that appear in δ are conjunctions of moves. Thus,
we have that δ(q, σ) =
∧
i(di, qi), for all states q ∈ Q and symbols σ ∈ Σ.
The semantics of the ATAs is given through the following concept of run.
Definition 27 (ATA Run). A run of an ATA A = 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉 on a Σ-labeled
∆-tree T = 〈T, v〉 is a (∆ × Q)-tree R such that, for all nodes x ∈ R, where x =∏n
i=1(di, qi) and y ,
∏n
i=1 di with n ∈ [0, ω[ , it holds that (i) y ∈ T and (ii), there
is a set of moves S ⊆ ∆ × Q with S |= δ(qn, v(y)) such that x · (d, q) ∈ R, for all
(d, q) ∈ S.
In the following, we consider ATAs along with the parity acceptance condition
(APT, for short) ℵ , (F1, . . . ,Fk) ∈ (2Q)+ with F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Fk = Q (see [16],
for more). The number k of sets in the tuple ℵ is called the index of the automaton. We
also consider ATAs with the co-Büchi acceptance condition (ACT, for short) that is the
special parity condition with index 2.
Let R be a run of an ATA A on a tree T and w one of its branches. Then, by
inf(w) , {q ∈ Q : |{i ∈ N : ∃d ∈ ∆.(w)i = (d, q)}| = ω} we denote the set of states
that occur infinitely often as the second component of the letters along the branch w.
Moreover, we say that w satisfies the parity acceptance condition ℵ = (F1, . . . ,Fk) if
the least index i ∈ [1, k] for which inf(w) ∩ Fi 6= ∅ is even.
Finally, we can define the concept of language accepted by an ATA.
Definition 28 (ATA Acceptance). An ATA A = 〈Σ,∆,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉 accepts aΣ-labeled
∆-tree T iff is there exists a run R of A on T such that all its infinite branches satisfy
the acceptance condition ℵ.
By L(A)we denote the language accepted by the ATA A, i.e., the set of trees T accepted
by A. Moreover,A is said to be empty if L(A) = ∅. The emptiness problem for A is to
decide whether L(A) = ∅.
Proofs of theorems We are finally able to show the proofs of the above mentioned
results.
Lemma 1 (SL[1G] Goal Automaton). Let ♭ψ an SL[1G] goal without principal subsen-
tences andAc a finite set of actions. Then, there exists an UCT UAc♭ψ , 〈ValAc(free(♭ψ))×
2AP,Dc,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ ,ℵ♭ψ〉 such that, for all DTs T with AcT = Ac, states t ∈ StT ,
and assignments χ ∈ AsgT (free(♭ψ), t), it holds that T , χ, t |= ♭ψ iff T ′ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ),
where T ′ is the assignment-labeling encoding for χ on T .
Proof. A first step in the construction of the UCT UAc♭ψ , is to consider the UCW Uψ ,
〈2AP,Qψ, δψ,Q0ψ,ℵψ〉 obtained by dualizing the NBW resulting from the application
of the classic Vardi-Wolper construction to the LTL formula ¬ψ [29]. Observe that
L(Uψ) = L(ψ), i.e., this automaton recognizes all infinite words on the alphabet 2AP
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that satisfy the LTL formulaψ. Then, define the components ofUAc♭ψ , 〈ValAc(free(♭ψ))×
2AP,Dc,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ ,ℵ♭ψ〉, as follows:
– Q♭ψ , {q0♭ψ} ∪Qψ, with q0♭ψ 6∈ Qψ;
– δ♭ψ(q0♭ψ , (v, σ)) ,
∧
q∈Q0ψ
δ♭ψ(q, (v, σ)), for all (v, σ) ∈ ValAc(free(♭ψ))× 2AP;
– δ♭ψ(q, (v, σ)),
∧
q′∈δψ(q,σ)
(v◦ζ♭, q
′), for all q∈Qψ and (v, σ) ∈ ValAc(free(♭ψ))×
2AP;
– ℵ♭ψ , ℵψ.
Intuitively, the UCT UAc♭ψ simply runs the UCW Uψ on the branch of the encoding indi-
viduated by the assignment in input. Thus, it is easy to see that, for all states t ∈ StT
and assignments χ ∈ AsgT (free(♭ψ), t), it holds that T , χ, t |= ♭ψ iff T ′ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ),
where T ′ is the assignment-labeling encoding for χ on T .
Lemma 2 (SL[1G] Sentence Automaton). Let ℘♭ψ be an SL[1G] principal sentence
without principal subsentences and Ac a finite set of actions. Then, there exists an
UCT UAc℘♭ψ , 〈DMAc(℘) × 2
AP,Dc,Q℘♭ψ, δ℘♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ ,ℵ℘♭ψ〉 such that, for all DTs
T with AcT = Ac, states t ∈ StT , and elementary dependence maps over strategies
θ ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘), it holds that T , θ(χ), t |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t), iff
T ′ ∈ L(UAc℘♭ψ), where T ′ is the elementary dependence-labeling encoding for θ on T .
Proof. By Lemma 1 of SL[1G] goal automaton, there is an UCT UAc♭ψ , 〈ValAc(free(♭ψ))×
2AP,Dc,Q♭ψ, δ♭ψ, q0♭ψ ,ℵ♭ψ〉 such that, for all DTs T with AcT = Ac, states t ∈ StT ,
and assignments χ ∈ AsgT (free(♭ψ), t), it holds that T , χ, t |= ♭ψ iff T ′ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ),
where T ′ is the assignment-labeling encoding for χ on T .
Now, transform UAc♭ψ into the new UCT U
Ac
℘♭ψ , 〈DMAc(℘)× 2
AP,Dc,Q℘♭ψ, δ℘♭ψ,
q0℘♭ψ ,ℵ℘♭ψ〉, with Q℘♭ψ , Q♭ψ, q0℘♭ψ , q0♭ψ, and ℵ℘♭ψ , ℵ♭ψ, which is used to
handle the quantification prefix ℘ atomically, where the transition function is defined
as follows: δ℘♭ψ(q, (θ, σ)) ,
∧
v∈ValAc([[℘]])
δ♭ψ(q, (θ(v), σ)), for all q ∈ Q℘♭ψ and
(θ, σ) ∈ DMAc(℘)× 2AP. Intuitively, UAc℘♭ψ reads an action dependence map θ on each
node of the input tree T ′ labeled with a set of atomic propositions σ and simulates the
execution of the transition function δ♭ψ(q, (v, σ)) of UAc♭ψ , for each possible valuation
v = θ(v′) on free(♭ψ) obtained from θ by a universal valuation v′ ∈ ValAc([[℘]]). It
is worth observing that we cannot move the component set DMAc(℘) from the input
alphabet to the states of UAc℘♭ψ by making a related guessing of the dependence map θ in
the transition function, since we have to ensure that all states in a given node of the tree
T ′, i.e., in each track of the original model T , make the same choice for θ.
Finally, it remains to prove that, for all states t ∈ StT and elementary depen-
dence maps over strategies θ ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘), it holds that T , θ(χ), t |=E ♭ψ, for all
χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t), iff T ′ ∈ L(UAc℘♭ψ), where T ′ is the elementary dependence-labeling
encoding for θ on T .
[Only if]. Suppose that T , θ(χ), t |=E ♭ψ, for all χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t). Since ψ does
not contain principal subsentences, we have that T , θ(χ), t |= ♭ψ. So, due to the prop-
erty of UAc♭ψ , it follows that there exists an assignment-labeling encoding T ′χ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ),
which implies the existence of a (Dc × Q♭ψ)-tree Rχ that is an accepting run for UAc♭ψ
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on T ′χ. At this point, let R ,
⋃
χ∈AsgT ([[℘]],t)
Rχ be the union of all runs. Then, due to
the particular definition of the transition function of UAc℘♭ψ, it is not hard to see that R is
an accepting run for UAc℘♭ψ on T
′
. Hence, T ′ ∈ L(UAc℘♭ψ).
[If]. Suppose that T ′ ∈ L(UAc℘♭ψ). Then, there exists a (Dc×Q℘♭ψ)-tree R that is an
accepting run for UAc℘♭ψ on T
′
. Now, for each χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t), let Rχ be the run for
UAc♭ψ on the assignment-state encoding T ′χ for θ(χ) on T . Due to the particular definition
of the transition function of UAc℘♭ψ, it is not hard to see that Rχ ⊆ R. Thus, since R is
accepting, we have that Rχ is accepting as well. So, T ′χ ∈ L(UAc♭ψ ). At this point, due to
the property of UAc♭ψ , it follows that T , θ(χ), t |= ♭ψ. Since ψ does not contain principal
subsentences, we have that T , θ(χ), t |=E ♭ψ, for all χ∈AsgT ([[℘]], t).
Theorem 9 (SL[1G] Automaton). Let ϕ be an SL[1G] sentence. Then, there exists an
UCT Uϕ such that ϕ is satisfiable iff L(Uϕ) 6= ∅.
Proof. By Theorem 8 of SL[1G] bounded tree-model property, if an SL[1G] sentence ϕ
is satisfiable, it is satisfiable in a disjoint way on a b-bounded DT with b , |P| · |V(P)| ·
2|C(P)|, where P , {((℘, ♭), (ψ, i)) ∈ LSig(Ag, SL × {0, 1}) : ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) ∧ i ∈
{0, 1}} is the set of all labeled signatures on Ag w.r.t. SL × {0, 1}. Thus, we can build
an automaton that accepts only b-bounded tree encodings. To do this, in the following,
we assume Ac , [0, b[ .
Consider each principal subsentence φ ∈ psnt(ϕ) of ϕ as a sentence with atomic
propositions in AP ∪ psnt(ϕ) having no inner principal subsentence. This means that
these subsentences are considered as fresh atomic propositions. Now, let UAcφ , 〈DMAc(℘)×
2AP∪psnt(ϕ),Dc,Qφ, δφ, q0φ,ℵφ〉 be the UCTs built in Lemma 2. Moreover, set M ,
{m ∈ psnt(ϕ) →
⋃
℘∈Qnt(V),V⊆VarDMAc(℘) : ∀φ = ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ) . m(φ) ∈
DMAc(℘)}. Then, we define the components of the UCT Uϕ , 〈M×M× 2AP∪psnt(ϕ),
Dc,Q, δ, q0,ℵ〉, as follows:
– Q , {q0, qc} ∪
⋃
φ∈psnt(ϕ){φ} ×Qφ;
– δ(q0, (mh,mb, σ)) , δ(qc, (mh,mb, σ)), if σ |= ϕ, and δ(q0, (mh,mb, σ)) , f,
otherwise, where ϕ is considered here as a Boolean formula on AP ∪ psnt(ϕ);
– δ(qc, (mh,mb, σ)) ,
∧
d∈Dc(d, qc)∧
∧
φ∈σ∩psnt(ϕ) δφ(q0φ, (mh(φ), σ))[(d, q)/(d, (φ, q))];
– δ((φ, q), (mh,mb, σ)) , δφ(q, (mb(φ), σ))[(d, q
′)/(d, (φ, q′))];
– ℵ ,
⋃
φ∈psnt(ϕ){φ} × ℵφ.
Intuitively, Uϕ checks whether there are principal subsentences φ of ϕ contained into
the labeling, for all nodes of the input tree, by means of the checking state qc. In the
affirmative case, it runs the related automata UAcφ by supplying them, as dependence
maps on actions, the heading part mh, when it starts, and the body part mb, otherwise.
In this way, it checks that the disjoint satisfiability is verified.
We now prove that the above construction is correct.
[Only if]. Suppose that ϕ is satisfiable. Then, by Theorem 8 there exists a b-bounded
DT T such that T |= ϕ. In particular, w.l.o.g., assume that AcT = Ac. Moreover, for
all φ = ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ), it holds that T satisfies φ disjointly over the set Sφ , {t ∈ StT
: T , ∅, t |= φ}. This means that, by Definition 16 of SL[1G] disjoint satisfiability, there
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exist two functions headφ : Sφ → DMAc(℘) and bodyφ : TrkT (ε) → DMAc(℘)
such that, for all t ∈ Sφ and χ ∈ AsgT ([[℘]], t), it holds that T , θφ,t(χ), t |= ♭ψ,
where the elementary dependence map θφ,t ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘) is defined as follows: (i)
θ˜φ,t(t) , headφ(t); (ii) θ˜φ,t(ρ) , bodyφ(ρ′ · ρ), for all ρ ∈ TrkT (t) with |ρ| > 1,
where ρ′ ∈ TrkT (ε) is the unique track such that ρ′ · ρ ∈ TrkT (ε).
Now, let Tϕ be the DT over AP ∪ psnt(ϕ) with AcTϕ = Ac such that (i) λTϕ(t) ∩
AP = λT (t) and (ii) φ ∈ λTϕ(t) iff t ∈ Sφ, for all t ∈ StTϕ = StT and φ ∈ psnt(ϕ).
By Lemma 2, we have that T ′φ,t ∈ L(UAcφ ), where T ′φ,t is the elementary dependence-
labeling encoding for θφ,t on Tϕ. Thus, there is a (Dc × Qφ)-tree Rφ,t that is an ac-
cepting run for UAcφ on T ′φ,t. So, let R′φ,t be the (Dc × Q)-tree defined as follows:
R′φ,t , {(t · t
′, (φ, q)) : (t′, q) ∈ Rφ,t}.
At this point, let R , Rc ∪
⋃
φ∈psnt(ϕ),t∈Sφ
R′φ,t be the (Dc×Q)-tree, where Rc ,
{ε}∪{(t, qc) : t ∈ StT ∧ t 6= ε}, and T ′ , 〈StT , u〉 one of the (M×M×2AP∪psnt(ϕ))-
labeled Dc-tree satisfying the following property: for all t ∈ StT and φ ∈ psnt(ϕ), it
holds that u(t) = (mh,mb, σ), where (i) σ ∩ AP = λT (t), (ii) φ ∈ σ iff t ∈ Sφ, (iii)
mh(φ) = headφ(t), if t ∈ Sφ, and (iv) mb(φ) = bodyφ(ρt) with ρt ∈ TrkT (ε) the
unique track such that lst(ρt) = t. Moreover, since T |= ϕ, we have that λTϕ(ε) |= ϕ,
where, in the last expression, ϕ is considered as a Boolean formula on AP ∪ psnt(ϕ).
Then, it is easy to prove that R is an accepting run for Uϕ on T ′, i.e., T ′ ∈ L(Uϕ).
Hence, L(Uϕ) 6= ∅.
[If]. Suppose that there is an (M ×M × 2AP∪psnt(ϕ))-labeled Dc-tree T ′ , 〈Dc∗,
u〉 such that T ′ ∈ L(Uϕ) and let the (Dc × Q)-tree R be the accepting run for Uϕ on
T ′. Moreover, let T be the DT over AP ∪ psnt(ϕ) with AcT = Ac such that, for all
t ∈ StT , it holds that u(t) = (mh,mb, λT (t)), for some mh,mb ∈M.
Now, for all φ = ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ), we make the following further assumptions:
– Sφ , {t ∈ StT : ∃mh,mb ∈M, σ ∈ 2AP∪psnt(ϕ) . u(t) = (mh,mb, σ) ∧ φ ∈ σ};
– let Rφ,t be the (Dc×Qφ)-tree such that Rφ,t , {ε}∪{(t′, q) : (t · t′, (φ, q)) ∈ R},
for all t ∈ Sφ;
– let T ′φ,t be the elementary dependence-labeling encoding for θφ,t ∈ EDMStrT (t)(℘)
on T , for all t ∈ Sφ, where θ˜φ,t(t) , mh(φ), with u(t) = (mh,mb, σ) for some
mb ∈ M and σ ∈ 2AP∪psnt(ϕ), and θ˜φ,t(ρ) , mb(φ), with u(lst(ρ)) = (mh,mb, σ)
for some mh ∈M and σ ∈ 2AP∪psnt(ϕ), for all ρ ∈ TrkT (t) with |ρ| > 1.
Since R is an accepting run, it is easy to prove that Rφ,t is an accepting run for UAcφ
on T ′φ,t. Thus, T ′φ,t ∈ L(UAcφ ). So, by Lemma 2, it holds that T , θφ,t(χ), t |= ♭ψ, for all
t ∈ Sφ and χ∈AsgT ([[℘]], t), which means that Sφ={t ∈ StT : T , ∅, t |= φ}.
Finally, since λTϕ(ε) |= ϕ, we have that T |= ϕ, where, in the first expression, ϕ is
considered as a Boolean formula on AP ∪ psnt(ϕ).
Theorem 10 (SL[1G] Satisfiability). The satisfiability problem for SL[1G] is 2EXPTIME-
COMPLETE.
Proof. By Theorem 9 of SL[1G] automaton, to verify whether an SL[1G] sentence ϕ is
satisfiable we can calculate the emptiness of the UPT Uϕ. This automaton is obtained
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by merging all UCTs UAcφ , with φ = ℘♭ψ ∈ psnt(ϕ), which in turn are based on the
UCTs UAc♭ψ that embed the UCWs Uψ. By a simple calculation, it is easy to see that Uϕ
has 2O(|ϕ|) states.
Now, by using a well-known nondeterminization procedure for APTs [23], we ob-
tain an equivalent NPT Nϕ with 22
O(|ϕ|)
states and index 2O(|ϕ|).
The emptiness problem for such a kind of automaton with n states and index h is
solvable in time O(nh).Thus, we get that the time complexity of checking whether ϕ is
satisfiable is 22O(|ϕ|) . Hence, the membership of the satisfiability problem for SL[1G] in
2EXPTIME directly follows. Finally the thesis is proved, by getting the relative lower
bound from the same problem for CTL∗
